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THE  QUESTION of how monetary policy affects the real economy is a 
perennial one in macroeconomics. Over the past several decades, 
however, the focus of the debate has changed. Today it is taken for 
granted  that  monetary  policy affects aggregate  demand;  what  is debated 
is why prices do not adjust  fully to compensate for shifts in demand. 
Thirty  years ago, in contrast, sluggish  price adjustment  was taken for 
granted;  what was debated  was the magnitude  of the effect of monetary 
policy on aggregate  demand  and the channels  through  which that effect 
occurred. 
This paper  returns  to the subject  of that older  literature.  A fresh look 
at the way monetary policy affects aggregate  demand is particularly 
timely in light of recent developments  in theoretical  analyses of credit 
markets.  Work  over the past 15 years has suggested  that imperfections 
are  a central  feature  of capital  markets,  and  that  these imperfections  can 
cause credit allocation to be made largely on the basis of quantity 
rationing  rather  than price adjustment  and can create a special role for 
lending  by financial  intermediaries.  This  work  has also shown  that  credit 
market  imperfections  can have important  consequences for macroeco- 
nomic fluctuations in general and for the way  monetary policy is 
transmitted  to aggregate  demand  in particular. 
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Our  central  goal in this paper is to assess certain recent theories of 
the transmission  mechanism based on credit market imperfections. 
Specifically, our focus is on theories that emphasize the effects of 
monetary  policy as it operates  through  bank  lending  rather  than  through 
banks' transactions  balances. To understand  the issue, it is helpful to 
consider two polar views of the initial impact of monetary policy on 
financial  markets. In both views, a decline in the stock of reserves 
coupled with less than full price adjustment  leads to a rise in interest 
rates to clear the market  for reserves; in both, the higher  interest rates 
then depress aggregate  demand.  The two accounts differ, however, in 
explaining  the source  of the  demand  for  reserves, and  hence in explaining 
the initial  rise in interest  rates. 
The first  view is a traditional  textbook description  in which reserves 
are valued because they are held against  transactions  deposits that can 
only be issued by banks. According  to this view, a reduction  in reserves 
raises interest rates because it implies a fall in transactions  deposits. 
Thus the initial  impact  of monetary  policy on interest rates arises from 
the special characteristics  of the liability  side of banks' balance sheets; 
the asset side plays no role. For simplicity, we refer to this account of 
the transmission  mechanism  as the "money" view. 
In the second polar view, it is banks' lending activities that cause 
reserves to be valuable. Information  asymmetries are potentially ex- 
tremely important  in credit markets.' Because of this, the information 
that  banks  have about  their  customers  may be critical  to the customers' 
ability  to obtain  loans;  if banks  are  for some reason  unable  to lend, other 
potential lenders, not possessing the same information  about the cus- 
tomers, cannot make the loans instead. In this situation, even if bank 
liabilities  have no distinctive  features,  a reduction  in  the stock of reserves 
will necessarily reduce the quantity  of such loans. Competition  among 
banks for the scarce reserves needed to make these loans will then bid 
up interest  rates paid by banks to depositors, and this in turn  will raise 
interest rates throughout the economy.  Here the initial impact of 
monetary policy on interest rates hinges on the features of the asset 
1. For analyses of the microeconomic  consequences of asymmetric  information  in 
credit  markets,  see, for example,  Jaffee  and  Russell  (1976);  Townsend  (1979);  Stiglitz  and 
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side of banks'  balance  sheets. We refer  to this account  as the "lending" 
view.2 
Determining  which of these views better  describes  the initial  steps of 
the transmission  mechanism  would further  our understanding  both of 
monetary  policy and  of the macroeconomy.  Understanding  the channels 
of monetary  transmission  would help monetary policymakers  decide 
which  financial  market  disturbances  warrant  changes  in monetary  policy 
and  which  do not. It would  also assist them  in the choice of intermediate 
targets  for policy. Distinguishing  between these competing  views would 
also improve our understanding  of how monetary and other financial 
disturbances  affect the real economy. Most important,  it could provide 
insight into whether asymmetric information  in credit markets has 
significant  macroeconomic  consequences;  this  is useful  because, despite 
the theoretical  progress  in modeling  the effects of credit market  imper- 
fections, we still  know  relatively  little about  whether  such imperfections 
are important  to the macroeconomy. 
In reality, a change in the stock of reserves requires simultaneous 
adjustments  in the prices and quantities  of the full array  of assets in the 
economy, and those adjustments  depend on the institutional  and regu- 
latory structure  of the economy.3  Nonetheless, we make no attempt  to 
provide a complete account of the transmission  mechanism.  First, we 
focus on the initial  impact  of monetary  policy on safe interest rates (or 
on credit market conditions more generally), and not on how those 
changes in turn are translated  into changes in aggregate  demand. For 
example, we do not attempt to determine the general importance  of 
credit  rationing  in the transmission  mechanism.  Under  either  the money 
or the lending  view, the channels  through  which higher  interest  rates  are 
translated  into lower aggregate  demand are likely to involve reduced 
demand  for loans of all types, and they may involve credit  rationing  as 
well. Second, although  the two polar  views set out above are  clearly  not 
mutually  exclusive, we ask which of the two provides a better approxi- 
mation  to actual  channels  of monetary  transmission;  in our view, there 
is simply  not enough  information  available  to attempt  the subtler  task of 
2. Farmer  (1984);  Blinder  (1987);  Bernanke  and Gertler  (1989, 1990);  and Greenwald 
and  Stiglitz  (1988a,  1988b),  among  others, present  models  of the macroeconomic  implica- 
tions  of credit  market  asymmetries.  See Gertler  (1988)  for a survey. 
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estimating the relative roles of money and lending in the impact of 
monetary  policy. And third, our analysis of bank loans focuses on the 
question  of whether  they are important  in the transmission  mechanism, 
and  not on the issue of whether  they have distinctive  characteristics  that 
are important  in other macroeconomic  contexts.4 
Empirical  work investigating  the money and lending views of the 
transmission  mechanism  has for the most part examined simple corre- 
lations of growth rates of money and output and of lending  and output 
and regressions of output on money and lending.S  These studies are a 
useful first step. But because they make no effort to address issues of 
endogeneity, they provide little evidence concerning  the nature  of the 
transmission  mechanism.  Money and lending  are affected  by economic 
activity. Thus correlations  of various  money and  lending  measures  with 
aggregate  output  may  capture  the effects of output  on money  and  lending 
rather than effects operating  in the opposite direction. The difficulty 
remains  even when one focuses on prediction  equations:  the fact that a 
monetary  or lending  measure  moves before real output  does not imply 
that  the former  change  causes the latter. 
4.  In addition,  we are  especially  interested  in the effects of monetary  policy operating 
through  the assets of financial  intermediaries  because of asymmetric  information  rather 
than  because of specific  regulations.  An obvious example  of an effect tied to a particular 
institutional  structure  rather  than informational  asymmetries  is the impact  of monetary 
policy on aggregate  demand  through  mortgage  lending  by thrifts.  The fact that mortgages 
are  easily repackaged  and  resold  today  suggests  that  lender-customer  relationships  do not 
provide  original  lenders  with  important  informational  advantages  in evaluating  the quality 
of their  mortgages.  Yet the structure  of financial  markets  through  the 1970s  gave thrifts  a 
special role in the mortgage  market,  and this fact, coupled with interest rate ceilings, 
caused  monetary  policy to have a sharp  impact  on mortgage  lending.  Because  this type of 
effect is not our  primary  interest,  in our  empirical  work  we focus on lending  by commercial 
banks  and  do not address  lending  by thrifts. 
5.  King  (1986),  for example,  investigates  the predictive  power  of measures  of money, 
lending, and interest rates for real economic activity. Similarly,  Bernanke  (1983)  tests 
whether  measures  of bankruptcies  and bank  failure  are useful in forecasting  real output 
during  the Depression.  An important  exception  to the focus on correlations  is Bernanke 
and  Blinder  (1989).  We discuss  the relationship  between  Bernanke  and  Blinder's  approach 
and  our  own below. In addition,  Wojnilower  (1980)  and  Eckstein  and  Sinai  (1986)  provide 
largely  descriptive  analyses  emphasizing  the role of lending  in cyclical fluctuations.  And 
there  are  important  studies  of the microeconomics  of credit  market  imperfections;  see, for 
example, Fazzari, Hubbard,  and Petersen  (1988)  and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 
(1988). Finally, note that investigations  of the cyclical behavior  of general  measures  of 
"credit"-for example, Friedman  (1982, 1983, 1986)  and Blinder  (1985)-do not address 
the  question  of whether  bank  lending  in  particular  plays  an  important  role  in  macroeconomic 
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The basic strategy  in this paper  is to examine  the behavior  of financial 
variables  and the real economy during  episodes in which the Federal 
Reserve undertook  large shifts in monetary  policy that were essentially 
independent  of real economic developments. In an earlier paper, we 
investigated  an  alternative  to purely  statistical  approaches  to the  question 
of whether  monetary  policy affects real economic activity.6  The central 
difficulty  in answering  that  question  (as with  identifying  the transmission 
mechanism)  is determining  the direction  of causation:  monetary  policy 
and various financial variables both affect and are affected by real 
economic  developments.  We  argued  that  there  is abundant  nonstatistical 
evidence  that  could  be extremely  useful  in addressing  this difficulty,  and 
that economists in fact often rely on such evidence in making  informal 
judgments  about  the effects of monetary  policy. The "Volcker disinfla- 
tion" of 1979-82  is a simple  and well-known  example. That  the Federal 
Reserve publicly announced  that it was undertaking  a dramatic  shift in 
monetary  policy to reduce the rate of inflation  strongly suggests that 
there  was an  independent  shock to monetary  policy. That  the announced 
shift was followed by a major  recession suggests that monetary  shocks 
have large  real effects. 
The goal of our earlier  paper was to investigate such nonstatistical 
evidence as formally  and carefully  as possible. The central  part of the 
paper  was a study of postwar U.S. monetary  history. Through  a study 
of Federal  Reserve records, we identified  six times since World  War  II 
when the Federal  Reserve appears  to have in effect decided to create a 
recession in order  to reduce the rate of inflation.  Because the decisions 
were motivated  mainly  by concern about  inflation,  they were relatively 
independent  of contemporaneous  real developments. The Federal Re- 
serve's shift to tighter  policy in late 1968, for example, was largely a 
response to the gradual  increase in inflation  over the previous decade. 
We found  that such shifts were consistently followed by sharp  declines 
in real economic activity; 33 months after a shift to anti-inflationary 
policy, for  example,  industrial  production  was typically  12  percent  lower 
than  would have been predicted  on the basis of real economic develop- 
ments  up to the time of the shock. 
In that paper we deliberately  avoided any attempt to examine the 
monetary  transmission mechanism. Our purpose was to investigate 
6.  Romer and Romer (1989). 154  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
whether  monetary  policy has real effects (and if so, what those effects 
are), not how those effects come about. But the identification  of shocks 
in monetary  policy that are largely  independent  of real  economic devel- 
opments is also extremely useful for studying  the transmission  mecha- 
nism. Because the episodes represent  independent  shifts in monetary 
policy, they can serve as experiments  for isolating  the channels  through 
which monetary  shocks affect the real economy. This paper therefore 
uses  information provided by those episodes both to  describe the 
financial  effects of shifts  in  monetary  policy  and  to provide  some evidence 
concerning  the validity  of the money and  lending  views of the transmis- 
sion mechanism. 
We conclude  that  the evidence appears  to favor  the traditional  money 
view over more  recent  theories  that  emphasize  banks'  lending  activities. 
Two types of evidence particularly  support  the traditional  view. The 
first concerns the structure  of financial  markets and banks' ability to 
raise funds. Because reserve requirements  on certificates  of deposit are 
low, banks  can obtain  funds  with little cost in terms  of reserve holdings. 
It follows that  even if bank  loans are special, restrictive  monetary  policy 
will have only a small  direct  impact  on banks'  ability  to lend. By contrast, 
because reserve  requirements  on transactions  balances  are  much  higher, 
monetary  policy has a much stronger  effect on the stock of transactions 
balances. Thus the impact  of monetary  policy on interest  rates is likely 
to operate  largely  through  bank  liabilities  (transactions  balances)  rather 
than  bank  assets (bank  lending). 
The second kind  of evidence concerns  the timing  of the money-output 
and lending-output  relationships.  With  regard  to money, we show that 
the money-output  link, particularly  the link between output  and lagged 
money, is largely a phenomenon  limited to anti-inflationary  episodes. 
That money leads output  in times of monetary  disturbances  and not at 
other  times suggests an independent  causal  role for money. With  regard 
to lending, we find virtually  no lag between movements  in lending  and 
movements  in output  either  within  or outside of our focal episodes. We 
also find little difference in the lending-output  link during the focal 
episodes and at other  times. Moreover,  the same findings  hold when we 
employ the available data on loan commitments  rather than data on 
actual loans. In light of the lags in the investment process and the 
differences between the focal episodes and other times, we find this 
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transmission  mechanism. Rather, it is consistent with the view that 
movements  in lending  are largely  determined  by movements  in output. 
As we discuss when we present the results, however, there are other, 
more complex (and in our view less plausible) interpretations  of our 
results  that  preserve  an independent  role for lending  in the transmission 
mechanism. 
The remainder  of the paper is divided into five sections. The first 
discusses banks' sources of funds and the structure  of reserve require- 
ments. The second section describes the behavior  of money, lending, 
and  interest  rates in the focal episodes. In the third  section we turn  to a 
comparison  of the strength  and  timing  of the money-output  and  lending- 
output  relationships  in  response  to independent  shifts  in monetary  policy 
with  those relationships  at other  times. The  fourth  section asks what  can 
be learned  by considering  differences among the episodes and banks' 
responses  to the tightening  of policy during  the individual  episodes. The 
final  section offers concluding  remarks. 
The Structure of Reserve Requirements  and the Impact 
of Monetary Policy 
Eugene Fama has observed that at the margin  banks obtain funds 
using instruments  that are highly substitutable  for securities issued 
outside the banking  system.7 Specifically, Fama compares negotiable 
certificates  of deposit (particularly  large-denomination  ones), which are 
issued by banks  and are subject  to reserve requirements,  with commer- 
cial paper and bankers' acceptances, which are issued outside the 
banking  system and  are  not subject  to reserve  requirements.  Fama  notes 
the similar  risk and liquidity  characteristics  of the two types of assets 
and  shows that  their  average  yields over the period 1967-83  are virtually 
identical.  Closer examination  of the yield spreads shows that they are 
indeed  much  smaller  and less variable  than other interest  rate differen- 
tials. Monthly  data for the period April 1971-May 1989 show that the 
yield spreads  of three-month  CDs with three-month  commercial  paper 
and three-month  bankers'  acceptances have standard  deviations of 18 
and 16  basis points, respectively (with  means  of 19  and  21 basis points). 
7.  Fama(1985). 156  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
In contrast, the standard  deviations of the yield differentials  of both 
commercial  paper  and  bankers'  acceptances  with three-month  Treasury 
bills are 63 basis points.8  In short,  negotiable  CDs, while not identical  to 
commercial  paper  and  bankers'  acceptances, are quite similar. 
The apparent  high  degree  of substitutability  between securities  issued 
inside and  outside  the banking  system has important  implications  for the 
transmission  of monetary  policy. In their  extension of the IS- LM model 
to include  a role for bank  lending,  Ben Bernanke  and  Alan  Blinder  show 
that if bank  liabilities  are subject  to a uniform  reserve requirement  and 
if, at the margin,  they are  a perfect  substitute  for securities  issued outside 
the banking  system, monetary  policy matters  only because of its impact 
on the asset side of banks' balance sheets.9 A specific instance of this 
arises if transactions  balances  and CDs are subject  to the same reserve 
requirements  and if CDs are perfect substitutes  for commercial  paper. 
In  this situation,  a decline  in  reserves  requires  a decline  in  bank  liabilities. 
But because the perfect substitutability  of CDs and nonbank  securities 
causes interest rates to be unaffected  by the proportion  of bank funds 
obtained  using  CDs, the  response  of the quantity  of transactions  balances 
to the decline in reserves is irrelevant  to the response of interest rates. 
Thus transactions  balances  play no role in the transmission  mechanism. 
Bank assets, in contrast, are central  to the transmission  mechanism  in 
this situation:  there are certain  loans that can be made only by banks, 
and a reduction  in the quantity  of reserves reduces the quantity  of these 
loans that  can be made. 
The case polar  to that of equal  reserve requirements  over all classes 
of liabilities is positive reserve requirements  on transactions  deposits 
and  zero reserve  requirements  on CDs. In this case, any special  features 
of bank loans would play no role in the transmission mechanism. 
Reductions  in the stock  of reserves  caused  by restrictive  monetary  policy 
would  reduce  the quantity  of transactions  balances. But this would  have 
no direct  impact  on banks'  ability  to lend:  banks  could simply  issue more 
CDs. Ultimately, bank lending would be affected through  exactly the 
same channel as other credit flows: higher  safe interest rates would be 
needed to clear the market  for transactions  balances, and these higher 
interest  rates would in turn  lead to reduced  borrowing  and  investment. 
8. The data  used in these computations  are  from  Citibase. 
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The actual structure  of reserve requirements  is much closer to the 
second case than to the first. Currently  the required  reserve ratio is 12 
percent for transactions  (demand)  deposits, 3 percent for short-term 
(less than one and a half years) time deposits (CDs), and zero for long- 
term CDs. This pattern is representative  of the structure  of postwar 
reserve requirements;  typically the reserve requirement  on demand 
deposits  has been between 10  percent  and  20 percent  while that  on large- 
denomination  CDs of fairly  short  maturity  has ranged  from  3 percent  to 
6 percent.'0  Thus banks can greatly mitigate  any direct impact of tight 
monetary  policy on their  lending  by issuing CDs subject  to low reserve 
requirements  in response to a decline in the quantity of transactions 
balances  caused by a reduction  in reserves. 
This discussion assumes that CDs are available as an alternative 
source of funds. But CDs did not exist before the 1960s,  and  even in the 
1960s they were subject to interest rate ceilings that were at times 
binding.  When  CDs are not available,  monetary  policy will have a direct 
impact on the quantities  both of transactions  deposits and of lending. 
Thus in this case the characteristics  of both the liability  and asset sides 
of banks'  balance  sheets are relevant  to the transmission  mechanism. 
The importance  of banks' ability to obtain funds with little cost in 
terms  of reserves can be demonstrated  in a simple  model in the spirit  of 
Bernanke  and Blinder's.  We focus on the financial  side of the economy, 
taking  aggregate  output as given, and analyze the impact of monetary 
policy on interest rates. Thus we effectively compute the size of the 
vertical movement in the economy's LM curve caused by changes in 
monetary  policy and  ignore  the determinants  of the slopes of the IS and 
LM curves. In addition,  for expositional  simplicity  we neglect holdings 
of excess reserves by banks and of currency by the public. We begin 
with the case in which CDs are available as an alternative  source of 
funds  and  then discuss the case in which they are not. 
Banks  have two types of assets, reserves (R) and loans (L), and two 
types of liabilities, demand deposits (M) and CDs (C). Certificates  of 
deposit  are  assumed  to be perfect substitutes  for "bonds" (securities  is- 
sued  outside  the banking  system);  we then suppress  the CD-bond  market 
by Walras's  Law. Reserve requirements  are T  on demand  deposits and 
10.  See, for example, Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System,  1983,  table 12,  pp. 236-37. 158  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1990 
T'  on  CDs;  thus R  =  TM ?+  'C and L  =  (1  -  T)M +  (1  -  ')C. 
Let i and p denote the rates of return on CDs-bonds and on loans, 
respectively. We assume that p depends on i, with p'(i) >  0: the loan 
interest  rate increases with increases in banks' cost of obtaining  funds. 
The demand  for transactions  deposits and loans is given by M  =  M(i) 
and  L  =  L(i,p) . We assume, using subscripts  to denote partial  deriva- 
tives, Lp <  0, Li >  0-loan  demand  is decreasing  in the loan interest 
rate  and  increasing  in the cost of alternative  funds-and Mi  < 0. We also 
assume  Lppi  + Li < 0; that  is, a general  increase  in interest  rates  reduces 
the demand  for loans. 
The  model  implies  that  the impact  of a change  in the Federal  Reserve's 
supply  of reserves on the bond  interest  rate is given by 
(1)  di  1 -  '  0. 
dR  '  [Lp  Pi +  Lj]  +  (7  -  T )Mi 
There  are several special  cases of interest.  If T =  T', di/dR  is determined 
entirely by the properties  of L(-). That is, if reserve requirements  on 
transactions balances and CDs are equal and if CDs and bonds are 
perfect substitutes,  transactions  balances  are  irrelevant  to the transmis- 
sion mechanism.  If T'  = 0, on the other  hand,  di/dR depends  entirely  on 
the properties  of M(T).  Equation  1 also shows that monetary  policy has 
no effects  if money  and bonds are perfect  substitutes  (Mi =  -  oc) or if 
loans and bonds are perfect substitutes (Lp  pi + Li =  -  oo).lI 
In the general  case, expression 1 suggests that the properties  of the 
demand for transactions  deposits are likely to be considerably more 
important  than  the properties  of loan  demand  for the impact  of monetary 
policy. Most obviously, 7  -  7'  is much larger  than 7'.  Thus di/dR is 
much  more  affected  by changes  in the responsiveness  of the demand  for 
transactions  deposits  to interest  rates  than  by changes  in the responsive- 
ness of loan  demand.  In  addition,  if  interest  rates  on transactions  balances 
are largely  fixed (by government  regulation,  for example), a change  in i 
will cause substitution  between money and other assets; loan interest 
11. Because of positive reserve  requirements,  it is reasonable  to suppose  that p rises 
more  than  one-for-one  with  i; this  is the basis  for  our  statement  that  perfect  substitutability 
implies L, pi +  Li =  -  oo.  The reason that policy is powerless  when loans and bonds are 
perfect  substitutes  is that  the quantities  of CDs and  bank  lending  can adjust  to the change 
in reserves  with a compensating  change  in the funds  that  firms  obtain  in the bond  market 
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rates (p), on the other  hand,  respond  to movements  in market  rates, and 
so the impact  of i on lending  operates  only through  the impact  of general 
interest rate movements on loan demand. If this difference in the 
responsiveness of interest rates causes Mi to be larger  than Lppi  + Li, 
this  too will  make  money  more  important  to the  transmission  mechanism. 
Finally,  introducing  excess reserves  to the model  would  further  increase 
the  importance  of money  in  the  transmission  mechanism:  excess reserves 
are almost surely held much more against transactions  deposits than 
against  CDs, and so the behavior  of this component  of the demand  for 
reserves  would be tied much  more  to money than  to loans. 
This analysis does not imply that bank  loans do not have distinctive 
characteristics,  or that those characteristics  are not important  for other 
macroeconomic  issues. Indeed, as Fama shows, the fact that banks 
profitably  make  loans using  funds  obtained  by issuing  securities  that  are 
virtually  perfect substitutes for securities issued outside the banking 
system and not subject  to reserve requirements  implies  that  banks  must 
have some compensating  advantage  in making  those loans. Nor does the 
analysis suggest  that credit  market  imperfections  are unimportant  at all 
stages of the transmission  mechanism.  What  it does suggest, however, 
is that  it may  be the case that  to a first  approximation  restrictive  monetary 
policy affects aggregate  demand by first raising safe interest rates to 
reduce  the demand  for transactions  balances  and  hence clear  the market 
for reserves, and  then affecting  markets  for loans of all types. Only  then 
would credit market imperfections come into play. In the following 
sections we investigate  whether  the data  support  this view. 
If CDs are unavailable,  the situation  is different. The condition for 
reserve market  equilibrium  is simply R  =  fM(i),  and the quantity  of 
loans is given by L  =  (1 -  O)M(i). Banks are now constrained in their 
lending  by the availability  of transactions  deposits, and so the behavior 
of bank  lending  is not determined  simply  by i.  12 The impact  of monetary 
policy on aggregate  demand  now has two components. The first is the 
effect through  its impact on interest rates outside the banking  system. 
The effect on i is given by di/dR =  1/4M'(i), and so here only the 
properties  of M(+)  are relevant. The second component is the effect 
through  the quantity of bank lending. The impact on L is given by 
12. We are assuming,  realistically,  that prohibition  on interest  payments  on deposits 
prevents  competition  among  banks  for  funds, at least in the short  run. 160  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
dL/dR  =  (1 -  )/4);  this is unaffected  by the properties  of the demand 
for transactions  deposits. The effect of this independent  change  in L on 
aggregate  demand depends on the degree of substitutability  between 
bank and nonbank  loans. If they are highly substitutable,  the behavior 
of L will be irrelevant;  if they are poorly substitutable,  the effect of 
monetary  policy will occur in part  through  its effect on L. Thus for the 
case of no CDs it is not possible to establish any presumption on 
theoretical  grounds  concerning  whether  the asset or liability  side of the 
balance sheet is likely to be more important  in the transmission  mecha- 
nism;  it is an issue that  can only be addressed  empirically. 
The Behavior of Money, Lending, and Interest Rates 
As described in the introduction,  our basic approach  is to examine 
economic developments in a series of episodes in which the Federal 
Reserve appears  to have deliberately  shifted  to tighter  monetary  policy 
in an attempt  to induce  a recession-or  at least a "growth  recession"- 
to lower the rate of inflation.  By focusing on times when the Federal 
Reserve appears to have been willing to accept output sacrifices to 
reduce inflation  rather  than times when it merely expressed a general 
desire for lower inflation  or price stability, we restrict  our attention  to 
times when the Federal Reserve had a serious intention of pursuing 
tighter  policy. And by considering  only episodes in which the Federal 
Reserve sought to lower inflation  rather than times when it acted to 
prevent increases in inflation that it believed would have otherwise 
occurred,  or times when it responded  to other  economic developments, 
we hope to ensure that there is no systematic  factor at work other than 
monetary  policy  that  might  be affecting  the  behavior  of financial  variables 
and  real output. 
Our methods for identifying shifts in policy and our grounds for 
selecting the specific dates that we do are described in detail in our 
earlier  paper.  The  identification  is based  on contemporaneous  statements 
of the Federal  Reserve's intent as revealed by the System's Record of 
Policy Actions and  the Minutes  of the Federal  Open  Market  Committee. 
The large body of evidence provided by these records allows us to 
distinguish  with a reasonable degree of confidence between shifts in 
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and shifts undertaken  to change aggregate  demand. Simply examining 
the behavior  of such  policy instruments  as high-powered  money, reserve 
requirements,  and the discount rate would not allow us to make this 
distinction.  And considering  the behavior  of variables  further  removed 
from direct Federal Reserve control, such as the money stock and 
interest  rates, would  introduce  the additional  difficulty  that  we could  not 
separate  changes  caused  by Federal  Reserve  decisions  from  ones caused 
by outside  developments. 
The dates of shifts to anti-inflationary  policy that we identified  are 
October 1947, September 1955, December 1968, April 1974, August 
1978,  and October 1979.  In some instances the identification  of a single 
month for the policy shift is  a convenient simplification;  in others 
(October  1979,  for example)  it is entirely  appropriate.  Because our data 
often do not begin until the late 1940s, the October 1947 episode is 
sometimes  excluded  from  the analysis  that  follows.'3 
In our examination  of economic developments  in these episodes, we 
use monthly postwar data. Our measure of bank lending is loans by 
commercial  banks. This series is available  since 1948  from the Federal 
Reserve Board's Banking and Monetary Statistics,  1941-1970 and 
Annual Statistical Digest; slight adjustments  are needed in December 
1972  and  January  1984  to account  for definitional  changes.  14 Our  money 
stock measure  is M-1. The Federal  Reserve money stock data  begin in 
1959;  we ratio splice the Federal Reserve series in January  1959  to the 
13. As we document  in our earlier  paper, the 1966  "credit  crunch"  does not satisfy 
our  criteria  for an episode of anti-inflationary  monetary  policy: there  is no evidence  from 
contemporaneous  Federal  Reserve  records  that  the goal of the policy was anything  more 
than  to prevent  further  increases  in inflation  caused by what it perceived  to be runaway 
increases in aggregate  demand. Nonetheless, the episode is widely viewed as one of 
strongly  contractionary  monetary  policy, and it is very possible that  it was: perhaps  the 
Federal  Reserve's motives are not revealed by the records, or more likely, perhaps  it 
tightened  much  more  than  it intended;  see, for example,  the account  in Maisel  (1973).  As 
we proceed,  we therefore  investigate  the impact  on our  results  of adding  the credit  crunch 
to our list of episodes. When  we do this, we date the shift to tighter  policy as occurring 
with  the discount  rate  increase  of December  1965. 
14. Specifically,  definitional  changes cause moderate  discontinuities  in the series in 
these months.  Lending  in December 1972  is $387.3  billion  using  the initial  definition  and 
$393.7  billion  using the revised;  the corresponding  figures  for January  1984  are $1,133.2 
billion  and  $1,167.2  billion.  We therefore  multiply  all observations  before  January  1984  by 
1,167.2/1,133.2,  and  all observations  before  December  1972  by an additional  393.7/387.3. 
Bernanke  and Blinder (1989) use essentially the same series in their analysis of the 
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M-1 series constructed by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz.15 
Finally,  we measure  real  output  by industrial  production  in manufactur- 
ing. Where they are available, we use seasonally unadjusted  data and 
include  monthly  dummy  variables  in our  regressions.  Because Friedman 
and Schwartz  present their data only in seasonally adjusted  form, we 
employ  adjusted  money stock data. 
The next part of this section sets the stage for the remainder  of our 
analysis  by documenting  the behavior  of money, lending,  interest  rates, 
and interest  rate spreads  in the focal episodes. Of course, a finding  that 
money or lending fell in the focal episodes might simply reflect the 
variable's  usual  response to cyclical fluctuations  .16 The final  part  of this 
section therefore  examines  whether  money and  loans are unusually  low 
in times of tight monetary  policy given their normal  cyclical behavior. 
In  the  following  section  we turn  to a  more  systematic  attempt  to determine 
the roles of money and  lending  in the transmission  mechanism. 
Behavior in the Focal Episodes 
Figure 1 summarizes the behavior of the money stock and bank 
lending in five episodes of anti-inflationary  monetary  policy. The plot 
for money shows, for the three years following the policy shifts, the 
average departure  of the actual path of M-1 from a dynamic forecast 
made using a simple univariate  forecasting equation. The forecast is 
obtained from a regression of the monthly change in log money on a 
constant,  trend,  and  24 own lags. For each shock, we use the actual  path 
of money  up  to the month  before  the shock  and  the estimated  coefficients 
from the forecasting equation to construct a dynamic forecast of the 
changes in log money over the next 36 months. We then cumulate  the 
forecasted changes to obtain forecasts for the level of log money and 
find  the  resulting  forecast  errors.  For  example,  the observation  for  month 
nine in the figure shows that on average over the five episodes, nine 
15. Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1970). 
16. This difficulty  arises in Bernanke  and Blinder's  (1989)  investigation  of the trans- 
mission  mechanism.  Using  the federal  funds  rate  as their  measure  of changes  in monetary 
policy, Bernanke  and  Blinder  examine  the responses  of money  and  lending  to changes  in 
monetary  policy, and  compare  those responses  with  the responses  of real  output.  As they 
note, their approach,  although  suggestive, cannot disentangle  independent  roles in the 
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Figure  1. Average  Forecast  Errors  for Money  and Bank  Lending  after Shifts 
to Anti-Inflationary  Policya 
Percent 
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Sources:  The  money  stock  measure  is M-l  taken from the Federal  Reserve  money  stock  data beginning in  1959 
and  spliced  to  the  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1970)  M-1  series.  The  measure  of  bank  lending  is  loans  made  by 
commercial banks as reported in Federal Reserve  Board, Bantkinig  anid Monetary  Statistics,  1941-1970  and Annuiiial 
Statistical  Digest. 
a.  Forecast  errors in table  1 are converted  to  percent  by multiplying figures by  100 and then averaged.  October 
1947 episode  excluded. 
months  after  the policy shift  the money stock was 1.9  percent  lower than 
would  have been predicted  at the time of the shock using  the forecasting 
equation.  The plot for lending shows the analogous  forecast errors  for 
bank lending.'7  Table 1 presents the forecast errors  for the individual 
episodes. 
Figure  1  and  table 1 show that  money falls below the paths  one would 
have  predicted  on the basis of the simple  forecasting  equation  soon after 
the shifts to anti-inflationary  policy. Just two months after the shocks, 
the forecast errors  for money are negative in four of the five episodes. 
17. Because  the lending  data  are not seasonally  adjusted,  in this case the forecasting 
equation  includes  monthly  dummies.  The sample  periods  are  February  1946-May  1989  for 
the money  regression  and February  1950-December  1986  for the lending  regression;  the 
precise  starting  and  ending  dates are  determined  by the availability  of the data. 164  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 1.  Behavior of Money and Bank Lending in Episodes of Anti-Inflationary 
Monetary Policya 
Month  Date of shock 
after  September  December  April  August  October 
shock  1955  1968  1974  1978  1979 
Forecast error  (cumulative)  for log M-1 
0  0.002  0.000  -  0.002  0.001  -0.012 
1  -  0.000  0.000  -  0.004  0.006  -0.014 
2  -0.004  -0.003  -  0.004  0.003  -0.016 
3  -0.004  -0.004  -  0.006  0.004  -  0.022 
4  -  0.005  -  0.005  -  0.008  0.005  -0.016 
5  -  0.007  -  0.009  -0.009  0.000  -0.031 
6  -0.008  -0.011  -  0.008  -0.001  -0.058 
9  -0.013  -  0.023  -0.016  -0.004  -  0.042 
12  -0.019  -0.029  -0.022  0.016  -  0.016 
15  -  0.020  -  0.034  -0.010  0.011  -  0.033 
18  -0.027  -0.040  -0.017  0.012  -0.024 
21  -  0.035  -  0.033  -0.018  -0.029  -  0.035 
24  -0.044  -  0.033  -0.014  0.008  -  0.042 
30  -0.061  -0.018  -0.013  0.010  -0.044 
35  -  0.056  -  0.020  -  0.002  0.007  -  0.033 
Forecast error  (cumulative)  for log loans 
0  0.003  -  0.001  0.019  -0.003  -0.008 
1  -0.002  -  0.015  0.026  0.000  -  0.026 
2  -  0.001  -0.006  0.030  0.004  -  0.032 
3  -  0.004  -0.010  0.041  0.008  -  0.028 
4  -0.008  -  0.003  0.045  0.009  -0.024 
5  -  0.013  -  0.001  0.046  0.017  -  0.028 
6  -  0.004  -0.001  0.044  0.019  -  0.041 
9  -0.008  -  0.033  0.032  0.027  -  0.080 
12  -  0.012  -  0.032  -  0.005  0.048  -  0.068 
15  -0.018  -0.062  -  0.033  0.047  -  0.053 
18  -0.022  -  0.067  -  0.053  0.059  -  0.064 
21  -0.016  -  0.066  -  0.073  0.030  -  0.065 
24  -  0.028  -  0.073  -  0.091  0.018  -  0.061 
30  -  0.076  -  0.080  -  0.098  0.029  -  0.091 
35  -0.113  -0.081  -0.099  0.010  -0.103 
Sources:  The  money  stock  measure is M-1 taken from the Federal Reserve  money  stock  data beginning in  1959 
and  spliced  to  the  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1970)  M-1  series.  The  measure  of  bank  lending  is  loans  made  by 
commercial  banks as reported in Federal Reserve  Board, Baniking and Monetary  Statistics,  1941-1970  and Annual 
Statistical  Digest. 
a.  The  forecasts  are made using  a  regression  of  the  monthly  change  in log  money  or log  loans  on  a constant, 
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By seven months  after  the shock the average  forecast  error  is 2 percent; 
thereafter  they typically  become only slightly  larger.  The standard  error 
of the estimate  in the forecasting  equation  is 0.4 percent;  thus a forecast 
error  of 2 percent  over seven months  is substantial.  18 
The departures  of lending  from  its forecasted  paths  are less rapid  but 
larger than the movements in money. Lending typically shows little 
change (and in fact remains  on average above the forecasted paths) in 
the first  six months  after  the shifts in policy but then falls sharply  below 
the predicted  paths.  The average  forecast error  is 1.4 percent 12  months 
after the policy shifts, 2.9 percent at 18 months, and 6.3 percent at 30 
months.  For comparison,  the standard  error  of the forecasting  equation 
is 0.6 percent.  19 
Figure  2 plots the average  value of the three-month  Treasury  bill rate 
around  the  dates  for  which  we identify  shifts  to anti-inflationary  monetary 
policy. The data  point for month 12, for example, is the average  across 
the episodes of the Treasury  bill rate 12  months  after  the shift  in policy. 
Table 2 reports the data for the individual  episodes.20  The figure and 
table show that interest rates rise sharply  and consistently around  the 
times of the policy shifts. For example, the Treasury  bill rate  rises from 
an average of 6.00 percent three months before a policy shift to 7.73 
percent six months after. Typically the difference between the lowest 
monthly  figure  in the several months before a shock and the highest in 
the several  months  after  exceeds 50  percent.21  The  fact that  interest  rates 
18. If the log money stock  followed  a random  walk, the standard  error  of the average 
forecast  error  for the five episodes after  seven months  would  be (V7 / \/5) 0.4 percent = 
0.5 percent. Because there is some persistence  to changes in money, the true standard 
error  is slightly  larger. 
19. Simply  examining  the behavior  of the growth  rates of money and lending  rather 
than  the forecast  errors  yields a similar  picture.  The growth  rate of money averages  6.3 
percent  in the 12  months  before  the shocks, 4.6 percent  in the 12  months  after  the shocks, 
and  4.4 percent  in the  following  12  months.  For  lending,  the corresponding  figures  are 14.4 
percent,  9.1 percent,  and  5.2 percent. 
20. Because  many  interest  rate  series  do not  begin  until  after  1947,  the averages  shown 
in the figures  and  reported  in the text (like  those for money  and  lending)  exclude the 1947 
episode. When the relevant  interest rate series are available  for this episode, they are 
reported  in the tables. 
21. That  portions  of the rate  increases  occur before the specific  months  in which we 
identify  the policy shifts  is not surprising.  The decisions to attempt  to sacrifice  output  to 
reduce inflation  were typically preceded by periods in which growing  concern about 
inflation  led the Federal  Reserve  to act gradually  to raise  interest  rates  in an effort  to damp 
output  expansion  and prevent  any further  increases  in inflation.  In addition,  despite our 
assignment  of exact  dates  to the policy  changes,  the shifts  in  fact often  occurred  gradually. 166  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 2.  Average Treasury Bill Rate in Episodes of Anti-Inflationary Policya 
Percent 
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Source: Citibase.  See table  2. 
a. October  1947  episode  excluded. 
rise sharply  and  consistently,  together  with  our  earlier  finding  that  money 
and lending  fall relative  to their  usual behavior, shows that the times of 
independent  shifts in monetary  policy that we identified  solely on the 
basis of the Federal Reserve's statements  of intent are indeed times of 
monetary  upheaval. 
Table 3 and  figures  3 and  4 depict the behavior  of a variety  of interest 
rate spreads in the focal episodes. The movements in interest rate 
spreads  generally  confirm  conventional  views about the impact  of tight 
monetary  policy on relative interest rates: the federal funds-Treasury 
bill spread  rises sharply  and briefly  around  the times of the shocks; the 
yield differential  between long- and short-term  bonds typically falls 
considerably  and is consistently quite low for several months after the 
shifts;  and  the yield spread  between  low- and  high-grade  corporate  bonds 
rises consistently. 
The most notable finding shown by the table and figures is  the 
remarkably  rapid  change in the spread  between commercial  paper and Christina D.  Romer and David  H.  Romer  167 
Table 2.  Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate in Episodes of Anti-Inflationary Monetary 
Policy 
Percentage  points 
Month  Date of shock 
relative to 
date of  October  September  December  April  August  October 
shock  1947  1955  1968  1974  1978  1979 
-6  0.38  1.28  5.52  7.22  6.45  9.46 
-3  0.66  1.41  5.19  7.77  6.41  9.24 
-2  0.75  1.60  5.35  7.12  6.73  9.52 
-  1  0.80  1.90  5.45  7.96  7.01  10.26 
0  0.85  2.07  5.96  8.33  7.08  11.70 
+ 1  0.92  2.23  6.14  8.23  7.85  11.79 
+2  0.95  2.25  6.12  7.90  7.99  12.04 
+3  0.97  2.54  6.02  7.55  8.64  12.00 
+4  1.00  2.41  6.11  8.96  9.08  12.86 
+5  1.00  2.32  6.04  8.06  9.35  15.20 
+6  1.00  2.25  6.44  7.46  9.32  13.20 
+9  1.00  2.49  7.09  6.26  9.61  8.06 
+12  1.12  2.84  7.82  5.61  9.52  11.62 
+15  1.17  3.21  6.63  6.13  11.79  15.02 
+18  1.17  3.08  6.68  5.96  12.86  13.69 
+21  1.02  3.29  6.13  4.87  8.58  14.95 
+ 24  1.05  3.53  4.87  4.86  9.13  13.54 
Source: Citibase. 
Treasury  bill yields in the focal episodes. The yield differential  between 
six-month  commercial  paper and three-month  Treasury  bills averages 
72 basis points one month  before the policy shifts and 153  basis points 
three  months  after. In all six episodes (including  the October  1947  one), 
the spread rises sharply within the first six months after the shock, 
although  in the 1974  episode-which  is the one in which policy appears 
to have been reversed most rapidly-the  spread  peaks after  just three 
months and then falls sharply. In the 1947 and 1955 episodes, which 
occurred in an era of relatively stable interest rates, the shift in the 
spread  is only 20 to 30 basis points; in the later episodes it is 100  basis 
points  or more. 
While  these findings  concerning  the behavior  of interest  rates  provide 
a check on standard  views about  the effects of monetary  policy, they do 
not allow us to distinguish  between the money and lending  views of the 
transmission  mechanism.  Both views are consistent with a rise in the 
general  level of interest  rates. And because quantities-either of money 168  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 3.  Interest Rate Spreads in Episodes of Anti-Inflationary Monetary Policy 
Percentage  points 
Month  Date of shock 
relative  to 
date  of  October  September  December  April  August  October 
shock  1947  1955  1968  1974  1978  1979 
Federal  funds rate minus three-month  Treasury  bill rate 
-6  n.a.  0.07  0.55  2.79  0.33  0.55 
-3  n.a.  0.21  0.59  1.88  0.95  1.23 
0  n.a.  0.11  0.06  2.18  0.96  2.07 
+3  n.a.  -0.06  0.77  5.37  1.12  1.82 
+6  n.a.  0.25  2.46  2.60  0.74  4.41 
+9  n.a.  0.22  2.06  0.87  0.63  0.97 
+12  n.a.  0.11  1.15  -0.12  1.42  1.19 
+18  n.a.  -0.12  0.92  -0.14  1.27  2.03 
+ 24  n.a.  -0.03  0.03  -0.04  0.48  1.54 
Ten-year  Treasury  bond  rate  minus  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate 
- 6  n.a.  1.40  0.20  -0.43  1.58  -0.28 
- 3  n.a.  1.37  0.27  -0.78  1.94  -0.29 
0  n.a.  0.90  0.07  -0.82  1.33  -1.40 
+ 3  n.a.  0.42  0.28  0.26  0.17  -1.20 
+6  n.a.  0.71  0.13  0.44  -0.22  -1.73 
+9  n.a.  0.51  0.07  1.24  -0.36  2.19 
+12  n.a.  0.54  -0.17  2.62  -0.49  0.13 
+18  n.a.  0.33  1.16  2.18  -0.45  -0.01 
+24  n.a.  0.39  1.52  2.70  1.97  1.61 
Six-month  commercial  paper  rate  minus  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate 
-6  0.62  0.41  0.73  1.70  0.35  0.41 
- 3  0.34  0.59  0.63  0.89  0.70  0.58 
0  0.21  0.47  0.21  1.46  0.82  1.53 
+ 3  0.33  0.45  0.80  4.17  1.59  0.66 
+ 6  0.38  0.75  1.79  1.90  0.69  1.73 
+9  0.38  0.89  1.39  1.04  0.37  0.23 
+12  0.44  0.66  1.02  0.54  0.87  0.70 
+18  0.39  0.55  1.53  0.52  0.74  0.48 
+24  0.33  0.47  0.86  0.37  0.48  1.18 
Moody's  BAA  corporate  bond  rate  minus  AAA  rate 
-6  0.63  0.46  0.79  0.81  0.73  0.95 
- 3  0.63  0.46  0.82  0.65  0.80  1.09 
0  0.65  0.46  0.78  0.62  0.75  1.27 
+ 3  0.66  0.47  0.66  0.76  0.80  1.33 
+6  0.69  0.50  0.72  1.21  0.82  2.15 
+9  0.56  0.50  0.91  1.98  0.97  1.58 
+12  0.66  0.51  0.93  1.63  1.12  1.92 
+18  0.75  0.77  0.77  1.76  1.19  1.68 
+24  0.75  0.81  1.48  1.54  1.51  1.71 
Source: Citibase. 
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Figure  3. Average  Values  of the Federal  Funds-Treasury  Bill and Treasury  Bond- 
Treasury  Bill Yield  Differentials  in Episodes  of Anti-Inflationary  Monetary  Policya 
Percent 
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Source:  Citibase.  See  table 3. 
a.  October  1947 episode  excluded. 
or of loans-can  be adjusted  only  slowly,  both  views  are consistent  with 
the  finding  that  interest  rate  movements  generally  precede  movements 
in financial  aggregates.  In addition,  the  rise  in the  spread  between  risky 
and  safe  rates  appears  simply  to  reflect  the  increased  likelihood  of  a 
recession,  and the fall in the  spread  between  long  and short  rates  is most 
likely  due  to the  fact  that  tight  policy  is not  expected  to be  permanent. 
Thus  the  behavior  of  these  spreads  does  not  appear  to  be  tied  to  a 
particular  view  of the  transmission  mechanism. 
Comparison  of  Behavior  in  the  Focal  Episodes  with  Usual 
Cyclical  Behavior 
To compare  the movements  of money  and lending  in the focal  episodes 
with  the  usual  money-output  and lending-output  relationships,  we  esti- 
mate  the  normal  cyclical  behavior  of  money  and  lending  and  then  ask 170  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 4.  Average Values of the Commercial Paper-Treasury  Bill and BAA-AAA 
Corporate Bond Yield Differentials in Episodes of Anti-Inflationary Monetary Policya 
Percent 
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Source: Citibase.  See table  3. 
a. October  1947  episode  excluded. 
whether  the levels of these variables  in the focal episodes are  lower than 
one would expect given this estimated  behavior and the actual move- 
ments in real output. A finding  that, for example, lending  fell by more 
than one would expect given the declines in output  would suggest that 
monetary policy had an effect on lending beyond its impact on real 
output  and  thus, potentially,  that  lending  played  an important  role in the 
transmission  mechanism.  A finding  that  the falls in lending  were no more 
than  one would expect given the behavior  of output, on the other  hand, 
would suggest  that we were observing  merely  the endogenous  response 
of lending  to the declinesin output. 
To carry  out this procedure,  we do the following.  We first  regress, for 
the full sample  period, the monthly  change in log money (or in another 
equation, log loans) on 24 own lags, the contemporaneous  value and 
twelve lags and twelve leads of the change in log industrial  production, 
and a constant, a trend,  and monthly  dummies: Christina D.  Romer and David H.  Romer  171 
24  12  11 
(2)  Aln  Mt = a + bt +  E  ciAln  Mt-i +  E  diAln  Yt-i +  k  Pit, 
i=l  ~~~~i=  -12i= 
where Y  is industrial  production,  M is money, and the D 's are monthly 
dummies. The leads of  industrial production are included because 
theories  that  account  for  the money-output  correlation  as an  endogenous 
response of money to output allow for the possibility that money will 
move in advance of output. Robert King and Charles Plosser, for 
example, argue that firms planning  to increase their output may first 
increase  their  holdings  oftransactions  balances  .22 Given  these equations, 
we then construct  (as before) dynamic  forecasts of the paths of money 
and lending,  now using not only the behavior  of money and lending  up 
to the times of the shocks but also the behavior  of industrial  production 
before  and  after  the shocks. We then find  the resulting  forecast errors.23 
The results are presented  in figure  5 and table 4. Considerable  parts 
of the movement  in both money and  lending  in the focal episodes appear 
to reflectjust  usual  cyclical  behavior.  At 18  months,  the average  forecast 
errors for lending and money given the realized path of industrial 
production  are  just 0.6 percent  and  0.7 percent,  respectively;  in contrast, 
the average  errors  not conditioning  on output  are 2.9 percent  for lending 
and 1.9  percent  for money (see table 1). 
Normal  cyclical fluctuations  in lending  are much  larger  than  those in 
money. For example, the sum of the coefficients on the output  variable 
is 0.50 in the forecasting  equation  for lending and 0.08 in the equation 
for money. As a result, the movements  in lending  in the focal episodes 
simply reflect usual cyclical behavior to a greater extent than do the 
movements in money. At most horizons, about three-quarters  of the 
average  forecast  errors  for  lending  shown  in figure  1  reflect  usual  cyclical 
patterns;  for money  the corresponding  figure  is about  a half. In addition, 
the conditional  forecast errors are slightly more consistently negative 
for money than for lending. The conditional  forecast errors  for money 
are negative at nearly all horizons in three of the five episodes and 
negative  in months  7-20 in a fourth. For lending, the errors  are consis- 
tently negative  in two episodes, generally  negative for most of a third, 
22. King  and  Plosser  (1984);  see also Tobin  (1970)  and  Sims (1983). 
23. We experimented  with also conditioning  on the actual  path  of inflation;  this had 
little effect on the results. Excluding  the leads of industrial  production  increased the 
magnitude  of the forecast  errors  for money  and  had  little  impact  on the errors  for lending. 172  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure  5. Average  Forecast  Errors  for Money  and Bank  Lending  Given  the Actual  Path 
of Industrial  Production  after  Shifts  to Anti-Inflationary  Policya 
Percent 
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Source:  See source note to figure 1. 
a.  Forecast  errors in table 4 are converted  to  percent  by multiplying figures by  100 and then averaged.  October 
1947 episode  excluded. 
and largely  positive in the remaining  two.24  Thus, although  the results 
are not sharply  different  for money and loans, they are slightly more 
suggestive of independent  movements in money in the focal episodes 
than  of independent  movements  in loans. 
24. The behavior  of money, lending,  and interest  rates in the 1966  credit  crunch  (see 
footnote  13)  is similar  to their  behavior  in the times  of tight  monetary  policy  that  we focus 
on in this section. The unconditional  and conditional  forecast  errors  for both money and 
lending  are consistently  negative  following  the discount  rate increase  in December  1965. 
The three-month  Treasury  bill rate rises from 3.92 percent in September  1965  to 5.37 
percent  a year later. From  December 1965  to June 1966,  the federal  funds-Treasury  bill 
spread  rises by 56 basis points, the commercial  paper-Treasury  bill spread  by 74 points, 
and  the BAA-AAA  spread  by 17  points.  The yield differential  between  ten-year  Treasury 
bonds and three-month  Treasury  bills is very low throughout  the period and becomes 
negative  in the last  four  months  of 1966. 
In addition,  because the money stock data extend back before 1948, we can find 
forecast  errors  for money following  the October 1947  policy shift. Both the conditional 
and  unconditional  errors  are strongly  negative. Christina  D.  Romer  and  David  H.  Romner  173 
Table 4.  Conditional Behavior of Money and Bank Lending in Episodes 
of Anti-Inflationary Monetary Policy 
Month  Date  of shock 
after  September  December  April  August  October 
shock  1955  1968  1974  1978  1979 
Forecast  error (cumulative) for  log M-1, given path 
of industrial productiona 
0  0.002  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.010 
1  0.001  0.002  -  0.000  0.005  -0.011 
2  -0.002  0.002  -0.000  0.004  -0.013 
3  -  0.002  0.003  -0.001  0.003  -0.017 
4  -  0.002  0.004  -  0.002  0.004  -  0.012 
5  -0.002  0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.024 
6  -0.002  0.000  0.001  0.001  -0.049 
9  -  0.003  -  0.008  -0.001  -  0.000  -  0.033 
12  -  0.009  -  0.007  -  0.009  0.020  -  0.012 
15  -  0.009  -  0.007  -  0.005  0.018  -  0.028 
18  -  0.008  -  0.009  -0.018  0.018  -0.017 
21  -0.011  0.001  -  0.025  -  0.020  -  0.024 
24  -  0.015  0.001  -  0.024  0.011  -0.027 
30  -  0.026  0.013  -  0.035  0.008  -  0.028 
35  -  0.028  0.002  -  0.029  0.003  -0.024 
Forecast  error (cumulative) for  log loans,  given path 
of industrial productionb 
0  -  0.003  0.002  0.013  -  0.002  -0.005 
1  -0.003  -0.011  0.013  -0.000  -0.019 
2  -  0.003  -  0.002  0.017  0.003  -0.019 
3  -  0.005  -  0.006  0.031  0.006  -0.014 
4  -  0.005  -  0.001  0.036  0.005  -0.008 
5  -  0.005  0.000  0.038  0.010  -0.009 
6  0.005  0.004  0.038  0.008  -  0.020 
9  0.006  -0.027  0.045  0.013  -0.048 
12  0.003  -0.018  0.033  0.028  -  0.032 
15  -  0.009  -0.040  0.026  0.023  -  0.016 
18  -  0.017  -0.032  0.014  0.037  -0.034 
21  -  0.012  -0.022  -  0.001  0.014  -  0.039 
24  -  0.018  -0.013  -  0.022  0.013  -  0.031 
30  -  0.018  -0.006  -  0.039  0.031  -  0.028 
35  -  0.018  -0.009  -  0.053  0.019  -  0.011 
Source:  See source  note to table  1. 
a.  Forecast  errors derived from equation 2 in text. 
b.  Forecast errors derived from 
24  12  11 
AinL,  =  a +  bt +  AcAlnL,_-  +  _  diAln  Y,  +  _  kjDi,. 
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Timing 
We now turn to a more detailed examination of the relationships 
among  money, lending,  and  output.  We focus especially  on the question 
of whether the strength  and timing of the money-output  and lending- 
output relationships  are different  in response to independent  shifts in 
monetary  policy than  they are at other  times. 
Approach 
To describe  our  basic approach,  it is useful to consider  regressions  of 
output  on money  and  on  lending  in  the  spirit  of the "St. Louis  equation"  :25 
24  24  1 
(3)  Aln Yt  =  a + bt + >  ciAln  Yt-i +  E  diAlnMt-i +  k  )Dit, 
i=l  i=Oi= 
24  24  1 
(4)  Aln Yt  =  a + bt + E ciAln  Yt-i +  E  diAlnLt-i + >kDit, 
i=l  i=O  i=l 
where  L is lending  and  the other  variables  are the same as in equation  2. 
As is well known, estimating  an equation  like equation  3 or 4 by ordinary 
least squares is not appropriate:  because movements in money and 
lending  are in considerable  part  endogenous, the estimated  di's will be 
biased  estimates  of the impacts  of money and lending  on output. 
Our episodes of anti-inflationary  policy represent  periods in which 
shifts in monetary  policy occurred  primarily  in response to the level of 
inflation  and largely independently  of other economic developments. 
Thus,  loosely speaking,  shifts  in monetary  policy are  the only systematic 
force in the focal episodes acting to change the money supply and 
lending.  It is therefore  natural  to estimate  equations  3 and  4 not by OLS 
but by two-stage  least squares,  instrumenting  for the financial  variables 
with a dummy  variable  for shifts in policy. Our  instruments  (in addition 
to the other right-hand-side  variables  in the equations)  are the current 
and 36 lagged  values of a dummy  that is equal to one on each of the six 
dates on which  we identify  shifts  to anti-inflationary  policy. The lags are 
included  because the dates represent  the beginnings  of episodes of anti- 
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inflationary  policy; thus the shifts in policy are likely to affect money 
and  lending  over considerable  periods. 
To interpret  this instrumental  variables procedure, it is easiest to 
consider  the case in which the lagged  output  variables  are omitted  from 
the equation. Because the constant, trend, and monthly dummies are 
included both in the instrument  list and on the right-hand  side of the 
equation, this procedure  is equivalent  to first demeaning,  detrending, 
and seasonally adjusting  the output, money (or lending), and dummy 
variables,  and  then regressing  the resulting  adjusted  output  series on the 
adjusted  money or lending series by two-stage least squares, instru- 
menting  with the adjusted  dummy. The fitted values of the first-stage 
regression  thus  represent  the average  movements  in  the  (adjusted)  money 
or lending  series relative  to normal  in the focal episodes. Thus, the two- 
stage  least squares  estimates  summarize  the relationship  between  output 
movements  in the focal episodes and the average departures  of money 
or lending  from  its usual  behavior  in the episodes.26 
Under  certain  conditions, the two-stage  least squares  estimates  from 
equation 3 provide consistent estimates of the impact of money on 
output. Specifically,  this will be the case if we have been successful in 
identifying  shifts in monetary  policy prompted  by concern about the 
level of inflation  rather  than  current  economic  developments,  if inflation 
does not directly  affect the path  of real output,  and if monetary  policy is 
transmitted  to the real  economy  entirely  through  the money  stock. Under 
these conditions, the movements  in money in the focal episodes would 
be exogenous, and the movements in money would be the only source 
of systematic  movements  in output  in these periods. However, although 
we are willing  to assume that the first  two of the needed conditions  are 
(at least approximately)  satisfied, we do not wish to assume the third: 
we wish to allow for the possibility that monetary  policy affects output 
not only through  money but also through  lending. The two-stage least 
squares estimates of  the di's therefore do  not necessarily provide 
consistent  estimates  of the impact  of independent  movements  in money 
on output.  For example, in the extreme case in which monetary  policy 
26. When  the  lagged  output  variables  are  included  in the  regression  (and  the  instrument 
list), another  variable  is being partialled  out, and the interpretation  of the regression  is 
therefore  more complex. The inclusion  of the lagged  output variables,  however, is not 
important  to our  results:  when  the  equations  reported  below  are  reestimated  excluding  the 
lagged  output  variables,  the results  are  little  changed. 176  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
affected output only through  lending (and in which output had some 
effect on money), both output  and  money  would  fall in the episodes, and 
thus the two-stage least squares  estimates of the di's would be positive 
even though  monetary  policy did not operate  through  its impact  on the 
money stock. Similar  comments apply to using instrumental  variables 
estimates of equation  4 to estimate  the impact  of lending  on output. 
In light of this difficulty,  we focus on comparisons  of OLS and IV 
estimates  of equations  3 and  4. The OLS estimates summarize  the usual 
money-output  and lending-output  associations. And, as just described, 
the IV estimates sumtnarize  the relationship  between the movements  in 
output and the average movements of money and lending relative to 
usual in the episodes. We concentrate  on two aspects of the differences 
between the OLS and IV estimates. The first  is the relative strength  of 
the estimated relationship  between money (or lending) and output. 
Monetary  policy is almost surely a relatively  more important  source of 
output  fluctuations  in the focal episodes than  at other  times. If this is the 
case and if the money-output  association primarily  reflects an effect 
operating  from money to output-that  is, if money plays an important 
independent  role in the transmission  mechanism-the  additional  inde- 
pendent  movements  in money in the focal episodes would cause the IV 
estimates to imply a stronger  effect of money on output than the OLS 
estimates. If, on the other  hand,  monetary  policy affects output  through 
channels  other than  the money stock, and if the money-output  relation- 
ship simply  reflects an effect of output  on money both in and out of the 
focal episodes, there is no reason to expect the IV estimates of the 
relationship  to be any stronger  than  the OLS estimates. Again, a similar 
discussion applies to the relative strength  of the OLS and IV estimates 
of the lending-output  relationship. 
The second feature of the OLS versus IV results that we focus on 
involves the time pattern  of the estimated links. Both the money view 
and lending view of the transmission  mechanism  plausibly imply that 
the relevant financial  aggregate  will lead real activity. Because much 
borrowing  is done to finance  investment  projects  that  are not completed 
instantaneously,  if contractionary  monetary  policy reduces aggregate 
demand  by restricting  the availability  of bank loans, one would expect 
declines in bank lending to precede declines in real output. Similarly, 
traditional  monetary  views of the transmission  mechanism  suggest  that, 
because consumers and investors respond with a lag to changes in Christina D.  Romer and David  H.  Romer  177 
interest  rates and producers  respond  with a lag to changes in spending, 
changes in money will lead changes in output. Thus, for example, a 
finding  that the IV estimates implied  a lagged  relationship  between the 
relevant financial  aggregate  and real output would be supportive  of a 
view of the transmission  mechanism  that assigned an important  role to 
that  aggregate.  This support  would  be strengthened  if the OLS estimates 
implied  a weaker  lagged  relationship:  the failure  of the OLS estimates  to 
detect the same relationship  would mean  that  the aggregate  did not lead 
output (or led it less strongly)  in times not dominated  by independent 
shifts in monetary  policy, and would thus cast doubt on theories that 
explained  the timing  of the relationship  as arising  from  a general  pattern 
of the aggregate  responding  to anticipated  output  movements  rather  than 
from  an independent  causal  role for the aggregate. 
As should be clear from this discussion, the interpretation  of the 
results cannot be airtight:  the identification  of independent shifts in 
monetary  policy is not enough to provide a definitive  identification  of 
the transmission  mechanism.  The best that one can do is establish that 
the data appear  supportive  of some commonly  held views of the trans- 
mission  mechanism  and  not supportive  of others, and ask whether  there 
are plausible  modifications  of the views that are not supported  that can 
make  them  consistent  with  the  evidence. For  this  reason,  after  presenting 
our results and our preferred  interpretation  of them, we consider some 
alternative  candidate  explanations. 
Basic  Results 
Figure  6 presents  the  results  of the  OLS  and  IV estimation  of equations 
3 and  4. The top panel shows the dynamic  responses of output  to money 
implied  by the OLS and IV estimates of the money-output  regressions. 
The bottom panel shows the analogous estimates of the responses of 
output  to lending.27  For money, both the OLS and IV regressions  imply 
considerable  lags in the money-output  relationship.  In both, the coeffi- 
cients on the contemporaneous  and  first  eight  lags of the money variable 
are all either positive or trivially negative, and the sums of these 
27. The period  zero response  of Y  to M is just do,  the contemporaneous  effect of AM 
on AYfrom  equation  3. The period  I response  is (c,do + d,) + do,  the period  1 effect on 
AY plus the period  zero effect. And so on. The sample period for both regressions  is 
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Figure 6.  Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Impacts 
of Money and Bank Lending on Industrial Production 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using the money  and lending data described  in the source  note to figure 1. Christina D.  Romer and David H.  Romer  179 
coefficients  are  highly  statistically  significant.  For  both  sets of estimates, 
the implied  impacts of money on output peak after eight months and 
then decline slowly. Even two years after  the shock, only about  half of 
the maximum  effect on real output has been undone. Perhaps more 
important,  the effects implied  by the IV regression  are much  larger  than 
those implied by the OLS equation; at most horizons the response 
function  computed  using  the IV estimates  is about  four  times as large  as 
that  obtained  using  the OLS estimates. 
These results are generally supportive of an independent  role for 
money in the transmission  mechanism:  money leads output, and the 
money-output  link is stronger  than usual in response to independent 
shifts in monetary  policy. One minor  difficulty  is that the implied  lag in 
the money-output  relationship  is no longer  using  the IV estimates  that  it 
is under  OLS. As described  below, however, our  finding  of any discern- 
ible relationship  between output  and  lagged  money  for the full sample  is 
due almost entirely to the portion of movements in money associated 
with the policy shifts. An additional  limitation of the results is that 
although  the point  estimates  of the impact  of money on output  are  larger 
under  instrumental  variables,  the IV estimates  are quite  imprecise.  As a 
result,  it is difficult  to reject  the hypothesis  that  the OLS  and  IV estimates 
are equal. Focusing on sums of coefficients  on the monetary  variables, 
the null  that  the two estimates  are  equal  is marginally  rejected  when one 
considers horizons of approximately  six months (that is,  when one 
examines the sums of the contemporaneous  and first six or so lag 
coefficients on the money variable), but cannot be rejected at other 
horizons.28 
For lending, the OLS estimates imply relatively rapid  responses of 
output to bank lending. The estimated impact of loans on industrial 
production  essentially reaches its peak after  five months  and returns  to 
zero  after  seventeen. In  the IV regression,  the estimated  effect of lending 
on output is virtually instantaneous. The contemporaneous  effect of 
lending  on output  is three  quarters  of the maximum  effect; the maximum 
itself comes after  just two months. After eight months the estimated 
impact  of lending  on output  fluctuates  irregularly  around  zero. The size 
28. Under  the null that the OLS and IV estimates  are equal, the OLS estimates  are 
efficient.  Thus  the  variance  of the  difference  between  the  two  estimates  isjust  the  difference 
of the variances.  (That  is, the standard  error  of the difference  is the square  root of the 
difference  of the squares  of the standard  errors.)  See Hausman  (1978). 180  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
of the estimated  effect of lending  on output  is no larger  under IV than 
under OLS. The absence of any significant  lags in the lending-output 
link and of any important  differences  in the strength  and timing  of the 
relationships estimated by IV and by OLS is not supportive of an 
important  independent  role for lending  in the transmission  mechanism. 
Again,  however, the IV estimates  are  very imprecise;  no null  hypothesis 
of interest  about  the coefficients  themselves or the differences  between 
the IV and OLS coefficients  can be rejected. 
Table 5 presents some simple regressions that reveal the essential 
source of the results shown in figure  6. We regress the change in log 
output  on current  and lagged  values of the change in log money (or log 
lending)  separately  within  and  outside  of our  focal episodes. To simplify 
the presentation, the regressions are estimated using quarterly  data 
(where the figure  for the final  month  of the quarter  is used as the value 
for the quarter).  In addition,  so that the R2's can be interpreted  as the 
explanatory  power  of money (or lending)  for output,  we first  regress  the 
change in the log of each of industrial  production, money, and bank 
lending  on a constant,  trend, and seasonal dummies,  and then estimate 
the money-output  and lending-output  relationships  using the resulting 
residuals. 
The regressions estimated inside and outside the focal episodes 
correspond  roughly  to the IV and OLS regressions estimated above. 
The within-episode  regressions  differ  from  the IV regressions  underlying 
figure  6 by treating  all of the movements in money and lending in the 
focal episodes, rather  than  just the average  movements,  as independent, 
and by not relying on the average difference between money's (and 
lending's) behavior in and out of the focal episodes to estimate the 
money-output  (and the lending-output)  link. And the regressions esti- 
mated  outside the episodes differ  from  the full-sample  OLS regressions 
simply by placing no weight on the behavior of money, lending, and 
output  in the periods  of large  independent  shifts in policy. 
The results of this comparison  are very similar  to those of the IV 
versus OLS comparison.  First, both in and out of the focal episodes 
there is no lag at all in the link between lending  and output. In fact, the 
coefficients on the lagged lending variables are consistently negative. 
Second, while the lending-output  relationship  is little different  in times 
of large independent  shifts in monetary  policy than it is at other times, 
the money-output  relationship  changes dramatically.  The results show Christina D.  Romer and David  H. Romner  181 
Table  5. Regressions  of Industrial  Production  on Money  and Lendinga 
Anti-  Anti- 
inflationaty  inflationary 
Quarterly  episodes,  Outside  episodes,  Outside 
lag of money  Full  1-12 quarters  focal  3-10 quarters  focal 
or lending  sample  after shocks  episodes  after shocks  episodes 
Money 
0  0.72  1.48  0.50  1.49  0.33 
(0.30)  (0.46)  (0.44)  (0.51)  (0.42) 
1  0.71  1.39  0.23  1.28  0.61 
(0.33)  (0.44)  (0.50)  (0.54)  (0.48) 
2  0.52  1.39  -0.12  1.24  0.31 
(0.33)  (0.46)  (0.50)  (0.60)  (0.46) 
3  0.33  0.74  0.45  0.77  0.34 
(0.33)  (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.58)  (0.45) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.13  0.32  0.04  0.25  0.07 
Durbin-Watson  1.60  1.64  1.75  1.69  1.82 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.030  0.030  0.028  0.030  0.031 
Lending 
0  1.01  1.04  0.85  0.76  1.02 
(0.14)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.30)  (0.17) 
1  -0.06  -0.06  -0.08  -0.12  -0.10 
(0.14)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.27)  (0.18) 
2  -0.51  -0.55  -0.48  -0.36  -0.64 
(0.14)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.26)  (0.17) 
3  -0.22  - 0.28  - 0.24  - 0.33  - 0.19 
(0.14)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.26)  (0.17) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.31  0.36  0.24  0.26  0.32 
Durbin-Watson  1.91  1.72  2.04  2.01  2.09 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.027  0.029  0.025  0.030  0.026 
Source:  See source  note to table 1. 
a. Regressions  are estimated  using  quarterly  data  equal  to the figure  for the final  month  of the quarter  and using 
seasonally  adjusted  and detrended  changes  in logs of the series. The change  in log output  is regressed  on current 
and  lagged  values  of the change  in log money  or log lending  separately  within  and  outside  the focal episodes.  Figures 
in parentheses  are standard  errors.  Coefficients  and standard  errors  for constant  terms  not reported. 
that the relationship  between money and output, particularly  the link 
between lagged money and output, is to a large extent a phenomenon 
solely of the episodes of anti-inflationary  policy. Defining  the episodes 
as consisting  of the first  twelve quarters  after  the policy shifts, the R2 of 
the regression  of the change in log industrial  production  on the current 
and three lagged values of the change in log money estimated in the 182  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1990 
episodes is 0.32. The coefficients  on the lagged  money variables  are all 
large,  and  the F-statistic  for the null  hypothesis  that  the lags do not enter 
is 6.61, which is significant  at better  than the 0.1 percent  level. Outside 
the episodes, in contrast, the R2 of the regression is 0.04, and the F- 
statistic for a test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on the three 
lagged  money  variables  are  zero is  just 0.44, which  is highly  insignificant. 
Thus the fact that we detect some lagged  impact  of money on output  in 
the full sample OLS estimates summarized  in figure  6 appears  to rest 
entirely  on the large  estimated  effect  from  that  component  of movements 
in money associated with the independent  shifts in policy. Finally, the 
table  shows that  when  the episodes are  defined  more  narrowly  as ranging 
from  three  to ten quarters  after  the shifts-which  is the time  period  over 
which we found in our  previous  paper  that  output  fell in response to the 
shifts-the  results, though less dramatic, are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained  with the broader  definition.29 
Robustness 
We examine the robustness of our results in three ways. The first 
concerns the selection of shocks and the sample period. Focusing on 
only six episodes raises the possibility that a single highly unusual 
episode could be driving our results. To address this possibility, we 
examine  the impact  on the IV estimates  of the money-output  and  lending- 
output  relationships  of dropping  each of the shocks in turn.  That  is, we 
first  reestimate  the two-stage  least squares  regressions  using  the current 
and lagged values of a dummy  equal to one on the date of each of the 
policy shifts except October 1947;  we then reestimate  the regressions 
employing  a dummy  equal  to one on each of the dates except September 
1955;  and so on. We find that the results are quite robust to dropping 
individual  episodes. For example, when October 1979-which is prob- 
29. Our  results  concerning  the timing  patterns  of the money-output  and  lending-output 
relationships  are consistent with what other researchers,  using entirely different ap- 
proaches,  have found. King (1986),  using  Granger  causality  tests and vector autoregres- 
sions, finds  that bank  lending  has little predictive  power  for real activity. And Bernanke 
and Blinder  (1989)  find that money responds  more rapidly  than lending  to shifts in the 
federal  funds  rate, which they use as an indicator  of shifts  in monetary  policy. Bernanke 
and Blinder  also find that the declines in lending  occur contemporaneously  with falls in 
output  in response to changes in the federal  funds rate, while the falls in money occur 
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ably the most dramatic  policy shift-is  excluded from the construction 
of the dummy,  the estimated  maximum  effect on industrial  production 
of a 1 percent change in money falls from 5.6 percent to 4.7 percent, 
which is still well above the maximum  effect of 1.9 percent obtained 
using OLS, and  the estimated  maximum  impact  of a 1  percent  change  in 
lending  is unchanged  at 1.2  percent. 
Similarly,  because traditional  money-output  and credit-output  rela- 
tionships  broke down after the Federal  Reserve's changes in operating 
procedures  in October 1979,  the fact that our sample  extends past 1979 
appears  to have  the  potential  to cloud  the results.  30  We  therefore  consider 
the effects of stopping  the sample  in September  1979.  Again  we find  that 
the results  are little changed. 
The second way in which we investigate  the robustness  of the results 
focuses on the coverage of the lending  data. Theories of credit market 
imperfections  arising  from  asymmetric  information  apply  most  plausibly 
to loans to businesses. It is for these loans that  banks'  informational  ties 
to their  customers  are strongest.  The apparent  ease with which lenders 
resell other types of loans (notably mortgages) suggests that lender- 
customer  relationships  do not always  provide  large  informational  advan- 
tages. Thus one possible objection  to our results is that our measure  of 
lending  is excessively broad. 
To investigate  this issue, we examine the behavior  of bank loans to 
businesses in and out of our focal episodes. Data on commercial  and 
industrial  lending by commercial  banks are available since 1959. The 
behavior  of this series is in fact very similar  to that of total loans; thus it 
does not appear  that  noncommercial  loans are masking  clear  differences 
between times of tight money and other times in the link between 
business  loans  and  real  output.  Regressions  like  those in  table  5 estimated 
using  commercial  and  industrial  loans  rather  than  total  loans  yield  results 
very similar  to the lending  regressions  reported  there:  there  is a contem- 
poraneous  link between growth of business lending  and growth  of real 
output, but the lagged association is negative, and the relationship  is 
essentially the same in times of restrictive monetary  policy as it is at 
other  times. Thus there is no evidence that our use of a broad  measure 
of bank  lending  is important  to our  results. 
The final way in which we examine the robustness of our results 
30. For an account of the breakdown  of the traditional  relationships,  see Friedman 
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focuses on loan commitments. In many cases, banks provide lending 
commitments  before actually  providing  the loans themselves. Thus one 
possible  explanation  of our  finding  of essentially  only  a contemporaneous 
correlation  between  output  and  lending  is that  loan  commitments  precede 
output  movements  (either  in general  or in times of independent  shifts in 
monetary  policy) but that the borrowers  only take down the loans as 
they produce. 
From January  1975  through  June 1987  the Federal  Reserve kept data 
on unused  loan commitments  by large  commercial  banks  to commercial 
and industrial  firms, and on loans made under those commitments.31 
For this period it is therefore  possible to investigate the relationships 
between commitments and lending and between commitments and 
output. Table 6 shows some regressions investigating  this issue. The 
first column shows that for the full sample, controlling  for the past 
behavior of loans, unused commitments  have virtually no predictive 
power for loans made under  commitments.  Indeed, the point estimates 
suggest a slight negative relationship.  Because the quantity  of unused 
commitments  can rise  either  because  of an increase  in new commitments 
or a fall in the quantity  of loans taken out under  existing commitments, 
this result  may  not be surprising.  But  the second and  third  columns  show 
that this result obtains  even in our focal episodes. Thus the absence of 
any lag in the relationship  between lending and output in times of 
independent  shifts in monetary  policy does not reflect simply  a delayed 
response of actual  lending  to loan commitments. 
The remaining  columns of table 6 examine the relationship  between 
unused commitments  and subsequent  movements in real output. Con- 
sistent with our  findings  about  the commitment-lending  relationship  and 
the lending-output  relationship,  we find  that  both in general  and  in times 
of restrictive monetary policy, changes in commitments  do not lead 
changes in output.32 
31. The data  are from  the Board  of Governors'  monthly  G.21 release. The data  were 
often  revised  and  there  were several  changes  in the coverage  of the series,  and  the Federal 
Reserve did not revise the historical  data. To construct  reasonably  consistent series we 
therefore  splice together  the series presented  in various  G.21 releases, adjusting  for any 
inconsistencies  noted on the releases. A detailed  description  of how we constructed  the 
series, together  with  the series themselves,  is available  on request. 
32. In addition,  in our earlier  paper  we investigate  whether  our finding  that the shifts 
in policy lead to sharp  declines in output  relative to usual is robust  to the inclusion of 
various  measures  of fiscal  policy  and  supply  shocks. We find  no systematic  patterns  in the 
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Table 6.  Regressions Using Loan Commitment Dataa 
Regressions of lending  Regressions of industrial  production 
on loan commitmentsb  on loan commitments- 
1-36  7-30  1-36  7-30 
Monthly lag  months  months  months  months 
of loan  Full  after  after  Full  after  after 
commitments  sample  shocks  shocks  sample  shocks  shocks 
0  -0.145  -0.186  -0.022  -0.133  -0.044  0.061 
(0.116)  (0.148)  (0.176)  (0. 185)  (0.250)  (0.303) 
1  -0.069  0.048  -0.104  0.081  0.162  0.059 
(0.118)  (0.147)  (0.178)  (0.192)  (0.252)  (0.321) 
2  -0.036  -0.171  -0.271  -0.071  -0.160  -0.207 
(0.118)  (0.147)  (0.184)  (0.  191)  (0.245)  (0.323) 
3  -0.028  -0.046  -0.075  -0.144  -0.049  -0.029 
(0.117)  (0.145)  (0.191)  (0.191)  (0.249)  (0.334) 
4  0.266  0.292  0.290  -0.344  -0.488  -0.566 
(0.116)  (0.145)  (0.199)  (0.190)  (0.262)  (0.351) 
5  0.009  -0.126  -0.100  0.152  0.013  0.118 
(0.118)  (0.154)  (0.203)  (0.190)  (0.271)  (0.347) 
6  0.064  0.164  0.117  -0.010  0.070  -0.004 
(0.114)  (0.140)  (0.184)  (0.183)  (0.237)  (0.323) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.20  0.30  0.31  0.05  0.08  0.09 
Durbin-Watson  1.91  1.95  2.00  2.51  2.35  2.32 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.015  0.014  0.015  0.026  0.027  0.029 
Source:  Loan commitment  data are from  Federal  Reserve  Board  of Governors'  monthly  G.21 release. Data are 
available  from  January  1975  through  June 1987.  Also see footnote  31 for details. 
a. Figures  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  Coefficients  and standard  errors  for constant  terms not reported. 
Regressions  are estimated  using seasonally  adjusted  and detrended  changes in logs of the series. The lending 
regressions  also include  six lags of the dependent  variable. 
b. Sample  period  is January  1975-December  1986. 
c. Sample  period  is January  1975-June  1987. 
Candidate Interpretations 
The simplest interpretation  of our results is that money plays an 
independent  role in the transmission  mechanism  but lending  does not. 
That  money leads output  in response to independent  shifts in monetary 
policy but not at other times is consistent with an independent  role of 
money in the transmission  mechanism  and does not support theories 
that explain  the money-output  correlation  as the result of an impact  of 
output  on money. More  generally,  that it is sometimes  difficult  to find  a 
clear  relationship  between  money  and  output  suggests  that  a combination 
of the impact  of output on money and endogenous shifts in monetary 
policy causes there to be no simple link between money and output in 186  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
periods not dominated by independent shifts in money supply. Our 
findings  also suggest that simply  regressing  output  on money leads to a 
large  underestimate  of money's real  effects.33 
With regard  to lending,  the findings  that there is no noticeable  lag in 
the lending-output  link, that the relationship  is essentially the same in 
response to independent  shifts in monetary  policy as it is in general,  and 
that lending commitments have no important predictive power for 
lending  or output  are all consistent with the view that lending  is driven 
primarily  by output. At the same time, given the obvious lags in the 
investment process and the obvious differences between the focal 
episodes and other periods, these findings  appear  difficult  to reconcile 
with a central  role of lending  in the transmission  mechanism. 
There  are three  important  caveats to this interpretation  of the results. 
First, our estimates are imprecise:  in a volatile economy, six episodes 
are not enough to pin down the effects of monetary  policy with a high 
degree of confidence. Thus, although  we find the point estimates sup- 
portive of the money view of the transmission mechanism and not 
supportive  of the lending  view, it is possible that sampling  error  has an 
important  impact  on the results. 
Second, although  the results tend not to support  a natural  version of 
the lending  hypothesis, one can construct  more  extreme  versions of the 
theory  that  are  consistent  with  our  results.  One  could  argue,  for  example, 
that monetary  policy affects the money stock but that money does not 
in turn affect output, and that lending is  a critical and proximate 
determinant  of output  at all times. In this case one would not expect the 
lending-output  relationship  to involve lags or to be different  in and out 
of the focal episodes. While no statistical procedure can definitively 
untangle  channels of causation, our view is that this interpretation  is 
simply  not plausible.  In our theoretical  model, the condition  for money 
to play no role in the transmission  mechanism is that it be a close 
substitute  for other assets. This would lead one to expect the behavior 
of money to be highly  unstable  in response to shifts in monetary  policy, 
not that money would move in a way that was strongly  associated with 
subsequent movements in real output. The suggestion that lending is 
33. Our finding  for the postwar  period  that there is a clear and strong relationship 
between money and output in times of large monetary disturbances  and no simple 
relationship  at other  times  is precisely  the conclusion  that  Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963) 
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central  to all output  fluctuations  is difficult  to maintain  seriously given 
the prominence  of fiscal  policy and supply  shocks in various  parts  of our 
sample  period. And some further  modification  of the theory would be 
needed  to account  for our results concerning  loan commitments.  Thus, 
although it is possible to reconcile our results with a view of the 
transmission  mechanism  that  assigns  a central  place  to lending,  it appears 
difficult  to do so plausibly. 
Third,  the scope of our  results  is limited.  As emphasized  at the outset, 
we are addressing  not the general question of whether credit market 
imperfections  are important  in the impact of monetary  policy, but the 
narrower  question of whether a direct impact of monetary policy on 
bank  lending  is important  in the transmission  mechanism.  Nor are we 
testing  whether  bank  loans  are  special;  one view that  is entirely  consistent 
with the results reported  thus far is that banks have an advantage  in 
making  certain types of loans, but that the availability  of alternative 
sources of funds with low cost in terms of reserves causes monetary 
policy to have little direct  impact  on bank  lending.  If this view is correct, 
then  direct  shocks  to banks'  ability  to lend-such  as the financial  collapse 
that Bernanke  argues was important  in the Great Depression-would 
have important  real consequences.34  For the transmission  of changes in 
monetary  policy, however, the general  effect of the quantity  of reserves 
on economywide  interest  rates would  be more important. 
Indeed, there is a view of the transmission  mechanism  that is consis- 
tent  with  our  results-particularly our  finding  of no lag between changes 
in banks'  lending  activities and changes in real output-in  which credit 
market  imperfections,  in addition  to money, play a central  role. Albert 
Wojnilower and Otto Eckstein and Allen Sinai argue that "credit 
crunches'  -sudden  interruptions  of credit  flows-are  a central  feature 
of postwar  downturns.35  And these authors  assign an important  role to 
high interest rates in triggering  the crunches; Eckstein and Sinai, for 
example, emphasize the strains on firms' balance sheets and liquidity 
positions caused by high interest  rates. Thus, one possible view of the 
transmission  mechanism  is that tight monetary  policy first causes the 
general  level of interest  rates to rise to clear the market  for transactions 
balances,  and that the higher  rates then lead, with some lag, to a credit 
34.  Bernanke (1983). 
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crunch.  When  the crunch  occurs, the impact  on firms'  financial  positions 
is so dramatic  that it causes a sharp and immediate decline in loan 
commitments,  loans, and  spending.  Whether  the crunch  falls  particularly 
on bank  lending  rather  than  other  credit  flows would  depend  on whether 
the imperfections  that gave rise to the crunch (rather  than simply to 
higher  interest  rates)  were more  important  for bank  loans than  for other 
sources of credit. In any event, the initial  impact  of monetary  policy on 
interest  rates, according  to this view, would stem from its effect on the 
quantity  of transactions  balances. 
Interest Rate Differentials 
We conclude this section by briefly investigating the timing and 
strength  of the  links  between  various  interest  rate  spreads  and  real  output 
within and outside the focal episodes. As in the previous section, our 
purpose in examining  spreads is not to shed light on the money and 
lending  views of the transmission  mechanism  but simply  to investigate 
"stylized facts" about  the impact  of monetary  policy. We are  especially 
interested in the questions of whether conventional views about the 
impact of monetary  policy on yield differentials  are confirmed  by the 
behavior  of the differentials  in our  focal episodes and  of whether  general 
associations  between rate spreads  and  real activity reflect  the influence 
of monetary  policy. 
Table 7 presents regressions  of changes in log industrial  production 
on various interest  rate differentials  analogous  to table 5's regressions 
with money and bank  lending.36  The table shows that there are indeed 
systematic  connections  between  movements  in yield spreads  and  changes 
in real output in times of restrictive  monetary  policy. Increases in the 
federal funds-Treasury  bill and the commercial paper-Treasury  bill 
differentials  and decreases in the spread  between long-term  and short- 
term  bond rates are associated with declines in output  after one to two 
quarters.  The spread  between BAA and AAA bonds also moves with 
real output, though in this case the association is largely contempora- 
neous. 
36. We include  four lags of the right-hand-side  variable  in the regressions  in table 7 
rather  than the three included  in table 5 simply  because the movements  in interest  rate 
differentials  appear  more  rapid  than  the movements  in the quantity  variables.  Inclusion  of 
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The results  also show that  the associations  between rate spreads  and 
real output  are present  in weaker  forms outside the focal episodes. The 
lagged associations between the federal funds-Treasury  bill and com- 
mercial  paper-Treasury  bill  differentials  are  briefer  and  less pronounced; 
the link between the yield curve and output is essentially nonexistent; 
and  the correlation  of output  movements  with the spreads  between low- 
and  high-grade  corporate  bond yields is considerably  weaker. 
These results  largely  confirm  conventional  views about  the impact  of 
monetary  policy on yield differentials.  In addition, they suggest that 
previous findings  that interest rate spreads have predictive power for 
real activity occur at least in part because the spreads reflect shifts in 
monetary  policy. James  Stock and Mark  Watson,  for example, find  that 
the commercial  paper-Treasury  bill spread  is the single  most important 
variable  in their index of leading indicators.37  In light of the results in 
table 7 and our earlier finding that this spread appears to respond 
extremely rapidly to shifts in monetary policy, Stock and Watson's 
finding  is not surprising.  Similarly,  Stock and  Watson  find  that  the yield 
spread between ten-year and one-year U.S.  government bonds also 
serves as a leading indicator, and Bernanke  and Blinder  find that the 
federal funds rate outperforms  a variety of other interest rates as a 
predictor  of real  economic activity. Our  results show that  both variables 
reflect  shifts in monetary  policy.38 
The Individual Episodes 
Our  analysis  thus  far  has summarized  the average  patterns  in our  focal 
episodes with little attention  to differences  across the episodes. In this 
section we examine some of the evidence provided by the individual 
episodes. We do this in two ways. First, we compare the statistical 
evidence  about  the  relationships  between  money  and  output  and  between 
lending and output from the earlier and later episodes in light of the 
differences in the structure of financial markets in the two sets of 
37. Stock  and  Watson  (1989).  See also Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1989). 
38. Stock and Watson  (1989);  Bernanke  and Blinder  (1989). Bernanke  and Blinder 
provide  indirect  evidence  that  the superior  predictive  power  of the  federal  funds  rate  stems 
from  its responsiveness  to monetary  policy. And  Cook  and  Hahn  (1989),  using  daily  data, 
show that the immediate  effect of shifts in monetary  policy on the federal  funds rate is 
larger  than  their  impact  on Treasury  bill  and  Treasury  bond  rates. 190  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 7.  Regressions of Industrial Production on Interest Rate Differentialsa 
Anti-  Anti- 
Quarterly  inflationary  inflationary 
lag of  episodes,  Outside  episodes,  Outside 
interest  rate  Full  1-12 quarters  focal  3-10 quarters  focal 
differential  sample  after shocks  episodes  after shocks  episodes 
Federal  funds rate minus three-month  Treasury  bill rate 
0  0.0011  0.0049  -0.0035  0.0051  0.0005 
(0.0036)  (0.0050)  (0.0054)  (0.0064)  (0.0047) 
1  -0.0126  -0.0101  -0.0150  -0.0051  -0.0210 
(0.0040)  (0.0050)  (0.0077)  (0.0061)  (0.0058) 
2  -0.0113  -0.0173  0.0038  -0.0152  -0.0064 
(0.0041)  (0.0052)  (0.0074)  (0.0065)  (0.0059) 
3  0.0037  0.0038  0.0023  0.0019  0.0088 
(0.0040)  (0.0050)  (0.0072)  (0.0056)  (0.0067) 
4  0.0012  0.0011  0.0141  0.0055  0.0042 
(0.0036)  (0.0046)  (0.0067)  (0.0053)  (0.0061) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.24  0.36  0.19  0.21  0.27 
Durbin-Watson  1.80  1.55  2.01  1.42  2.00 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.025  0.026  0.022  0.027  0.023 
Ten-year  Treasury  bond rate minus three-month  Treasury  bill rate 
0  - 0.0082  -0.0104  -0.0012  - 0.0103  - 0.0029 
(0.0029)  (0.0037)  (0.0056)  (0.0036)  (0.0049) 
1  0.0086  0.0107  0.0018  0.0117  -0.0001 
(0.0035)  (0.0043)  (0.0077)  (0.0041)  (0.0065) 
2  0.0038  0.0027  0.0057  0.0005  0.0105 
(0.0033)  (0.0042)  (0.0063)  (0.0040)  (0.0060) 
3  0.0040  0.0072  -0.0012  0.0055  - 0.0005 
(0.0035)  (0.0046)  (0.0059)  (0.0045)  (0.0056) 
4  0.0010  -0.0002  -0.0010  - 0.0007  0.0012 
(0.0029)  (0.0040)  (0.0048)  (0.0040)  (0.0045) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.20  0.31  0.04  0.34  0.10 
Durbin-Watson  1.76  1.57  1.78  1.41  1.70 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.026  0.028  0.024  0.025  0.026 
Six-month  commercial  paper rate minus  three-month 
Treasury  bill rate 
0  -0.0098  -0.0137  -  0.0086  -  0.0227  -  0.0092 
(0.0053)  (0.0087)  (0.0068)  (0.0146)  (0.0054) 
1  -0.0284  -0.0193  -0.0319  -0.0276  -0.0288 
(0.0059)  (0.0093)  (0.0086)  (0.0158)  (0.0061) 
2  - 0.0018  - 0.0137  0.0080  0.0134  - 0.0027 
(0.0059)  (0.0098)  (0.0075)  (0.0145)  (0.0063) Christina D.  Romer and David H.  Romer  191 
Table  7 (continued) 
Anti-  Anti- 
Quarterly  inflationary  inflationary 
lag of  episodes,  Outside  episodes,  Outside 
interest  rate  Full  1-12 quarters  focal  3-10 quarters  focal 
differential  sample  after shocks  episodes  after shocks  episodes 
3  0.0047  0.0063  0.0075  - 0.0120  0.0142 
(0.0059)  (0.0097)  (0.0075)  (0.0123)  (0.0071) 
4  0.0077  0.0042  0.0126  0.0148  0.0083 
(0.0053)  (0.0083)  (0.0072)  (0.0091)  (0.0068) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.26  0.32  0.24  0.30  0.31 
Durbin-Watson  1.72  1.54  1.93  1.49  1.89 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.027  0.030  0.024  0.029  0.025 
Moody's BAA corporate  bond rate minus  AAA rate 
0  -0.0644  -0.0755  -0.0405  - 0.0549  -0.0639 
(0.0122)  (0.0161)  (0.0238)  (0.0201)  (0.0173) 
1  0.0145  0.0193  0.0092  0.0200  0.0092 
(0.0160)  (0.0199)  (0.0317)  (0.0230)  (0.0249) 
2  0.0182  0.0360  -0.0119  0.0317  0.0057 
(0.0159)  (0.0209)  (0.0280)  (0.0228)  (0.0244) 
3  0.0250  0.0265  0.0238  0.0231  0.0334 
(0.0160)  (0.0216)  (0.0255)  (0.0248)  (0.0229) 
4  0.0014  - 0.0132  0.0201  -0.0172  0.0103 
(0.0012)  (0.0175)  (0.0186)  (0.0212)  (0.0160) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.22  0.34  0.11  0.24  0.20 
Durbin-Watson  1.80  1.60  1.82  1.62  1.83 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.028  0.029  0.026  0.030  0.027 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using  interest  rate  data  from  Citibase. 
a. Figures  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  Coefficients  and standard  errors  for constant  terms  not reported. 
Regressions  are estimated  using seasonally  adjusted  and detrended  data;  the industrial  production  variable  is the 
change  in the log of the series. 
episodes. Second, we briefly  describe some qualitative  evidence about 
banks' behavior in the focal episodes and the implications of that 
evidence  for the issue of whether  bank  loans are special. 
Early and Late Episodes 
Because broad deregulation  of interest payments on transactions 
deposits  did  not occur  until  the 1980s,  after  the last of our  focal episodes, 192  Brookings Paipers on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
the most important  institutional  differences  among  our  episodes involve 
banks' ability to turn to alternative sources of funds. Certificates  of 
deposit  did not exist before  the 1960s.  Thus in the episodes beginning  in 
October  1947  and  September  1955,  banks  had  no ready  alternative  source 
of funds to transactions  deposits. By the time of the December 1968 
policy shift, the market  for CDs was well established. But CDs were 
subject to interest rate ceilings, and the ceilings were binding during 
much of 1969.  Banks' attempts  to turn  to alternative  sources of funds, 
such as the Eurodollar  market, were limited by the Federal Reserve. 
Thus  the first  two of our  episodes, and  to some extent the third,  are best 
described as ones in which banks did not have access to alternative 
sources of funds. In light of the simple theoretical  analysis presented 
earlier  in the paper, one might  therefore  expect the lending-output  and 
money-output  relationships  in these episodes to be different  from those 
in the later ones. Specifically, because banks could not mitigate any 
direct  impact  of tighter  policy on lending  by turning  to sources of funds 
with  low cost in terms  of reserves, one might  expect lending  to be linked 
more  clearly  to output  movements  in the early episodes than  to those in 
the later  ones. 
With only six episodes altogether  (one of which begins before the 
lending data become available), one should not expect to distinguish 
differences in the time patterns and correlations  of the movements in 
money, lending, and output with any precision. Nonetheless, tables 1 
and 4 provide some modest evidence of differences in the behavior of 
lending  between the earlier  and later episodes.39  Table 1 shows that in 
the two early episodes for which lending  data are available,  the falls in 
lending  relative  to its forecasted  path  occur  essentially  immediately  after 
the policy shift rather  than with a lag, a pattern  that occurs only in one 
of the three  later  episodes. In the early  but  not the late episodes, in other 
words, lending leads output. Similarly,  table 4 shows that in the two 
early  episodes lending  is below the path  one would have expected given 
the actual behavior of output; again this is not the case in two of the 
three later episodes. Thus the data from the individual  episodes are at 
39. Note that despite the fact that in our simple theoretical  model, movements in 
money  and  in lending  are perfectly  tied together  when CDs are not available,  in practice, 
because of excess reserves, security  holdings,  and so on, money and lending  need not 
move precisely together in the early episodes. Thus there is scope for attempting  to 
distinguish  between  the lending-output  and  money-output  relationships  in these episodes. Christina D.  Romer and David H.  Romer  193 
least consistent  with  the view that  when alternative  sources of funds are 
easily available, movements in lending are driven by movements in 
output, while when alternative  sources of funds are unavailable,  there 
are independent  movements  in lending  in times of restrictive  monetary 
policy. 
Figure  7 shows the results of a more systematic examination  of the 
differences between the early and late episodes. The figure  plots the 
response functions implied by two sets of instrumental  variables  esti- 
mates of both equations 3 and 4. Rather than using a single dummy 
variable  equal to one on the dates of each of the policy shifts, and lags 
of this dummy,  as the instruments  (along  with the other  right-hand-side 
variables),  we first use a dummy  equal to one on the dates of the first 
three  shifts  and  then a dummy  equal  to one on the three  later  dates. 
The key results  are in the bottom  panel  of the figure,  which shows the 
response functions of output to lending implied  by the two sets of IV 
estimates  of equation  4, the regression  of output  on lending. When the 
dummy  for the early  episodes is used, the estimated  real  impact  of a shift 
in lending  is consistently  positive, and there is a considerable  lag in the 
relationship.  In contrast,  when the dummy  for the final  three  episodes is 
used, the estimated  impact  of lending  on output  rises very quickly to a 
low peak and then fluctuates  irregularly.  Thus again  the results suggest 
a greater  role for lending in the transmission  mechanism  in the early 
episodes than in the later ones. For neither  of the sets of IV estimates, 
however, is the estimated  impact  of lending  on output  sharply  different 
from that implied  by the OLS estimates shown in figure  6. Finally, the 
implied  relationships  between money and output  are similar  for the two 
sets of IV estimates. 
Bank Behavior in the Individual  Episodes 
As we have discussed, there are two views of bank  lending  activities 
that  are consistent  with our  failure  to find  any significant  evidence of an 
independent  role of bank lending in the transmission  mechanism.  The 
first  view is that  bank  loans do not have important  distinctive  features- 
that is, that banks do not have any important  advantages in making 
certain  types of loans, and thus that  any particular  customer's  ability  to 
borrow  is not tied to the ability of a specific bank to lend. The second 
view is that bank loans are indeed special, but that for much of our Figure 7.  Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Impacts of Money and Bank 
Lending on Industrial Production for the Early and Late Episodes of Shifts 
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sample banks can turn to sources of funds with low cost in terms of 
reserves when restrictive monetary  policy leads to a reduction in the 
quantity  of transactions  deposits. 
These two views make differing  predictions about how banks will 
respond  to tight  policy. According  to the first  view, if restrictive  policy 
leads to a fall in the stock of transactions  balances, banks  will simply  let 
the size of their portfolios fall. In this view bank assets are of little 
importance-they are simply assets earning  the prevailing  rate of re- 
turn-and  banks' unique features, and their profits, stem from their 
transactions  deposits. Thus there is no incentive for a bank to attempt 
to turn  to sources of funds other than  transactions  deposits to maintain 
its assets holdings. According to the second view, in contrast, banks 
may  have  a strong  incentive  to attempt  to turn  to such  alternative  sources 
of funds. Here there is a group  of potentially  heterogeneous  borrowers 
who, at least in the short run, are tied to a particular  bank;  as a result, 
restricting  the quantity  of loans the bank  can make  raises the quality  of 
the marginal  loan. Thus there are profits to be made by going to the 
general  capital  market  for funds. 
Descriptions  of bank behavior and actions make it overwhelmingly 
clear  that  banks  are not indifferent  about  the asset sides of their  balance 
sheets. Certificates  of deposit and other alternative  sources of funds 
arose, in the standard  view, precisely  because  banks  desired  alternatives 
to transactions  deposits as means  of obtaining  funds to make  loans. The 
development  of CDs in the early 1960s, the growth of the Eurodollar 
market  in the late 1960s, and banks' use in the same period of bank 
holding  companies  to obtain  funds  by issuing  commercial  paper  were all 
responses  to the  limitations  of transactions  deposits  as sources  offunds.40 
Similarly,  conventional  accounts of banks' responses to times of tight 
money  emphasize  their  efforts  to maintain  their  lending  activities in the 
face of declines in the quantity  of transactions  balances. Wojnilower, 
for example, describes "chief executives of leading banks reportedly 
...  pleading with their counterparts in industry to renew  their CDs" 
during  the 1966  credit  crunch.  Indeed, a central  theme of his account  of 
postwar financial  history is banks' preoccupation  with their lending 
activity and their relative lack of concern with transactions  deposits 
except  as a source  of funds  for  lending.41  This is consistent  with  the view 
40. See, for example,  Wojnilower  (1980). 
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that bank  loans are special but that banks' ability  to turn  to alternative 
sources  of funds  causes restrictive  monetary  policy to affect the general 
level of interest  rates and  credit  availability  primarily  through  its impact 
on the stock of transactions  balances. 
Some modest quantitative  evidence that bank loans are special is 
provided by the behavior of the spread between CD and commercial 
paper  interest  rates  in the later  episodes of tight  monetary  policy. If bank 
loans were simply  generic  assets earning  the going  rate of return,  banks 
would not be willing  to pay a premium  to obtain  funds to maintain  their 
lending  activities  in  times  of restrictive  policy;  if bank  loans  were special, 
on the other  hand, banks  might  be willing  pay such a premium. 
Data on CD interest rates are available  only since the early 1970s. 
Figure  8 plots the path  of the rate spread  between three-month  CDs and 
three-month  commercial  paper  in the three  most recent  episodes of anti- 
inflationary  monetary  policy. The figure  shows a brief increase  after  all 
three shifts. In all three episodes, for example, the spread increases 
about 10  basis points in the four  months  after  the shock and then falls to 
roughly  its pre-shock  level over the next several months.  This pattern  is 
consistent with the roles that we are attributing  to bank lending and 
transactions  balances in the transmission  mechanism.  That the spread 
consistently rises suggests that as the reduced quantity of reserves 
shrinks  the funds available  to banks  from transactions  deposits, banks 
are indeed  willing  to pay a premium  to maintain  their  lending  by shifting 
to alternative  sources of funds with lower costs in terms of reserves. 
Because CDs and commercial  paper  are not exact substitutes,  particu- 
larly  in the short  run,  this process leads to a modest  temporary  widening 
of the CD-commercial  paper  yield differential.  But that the widening  is 
small suggests that the required  premium  is small-that  is, it suggests 
that  banks  are able  to obtain  funds  in the general  credit  market  relatively 
easily when transactions  balances fall. Thus again it appears that the 
impact  of monetary  policy on bank  lending  is for the most part  not direct 
but  takes place through  an increase  in the general  level of interest  rates. 
Conclusion 
A large body of recent theoretical work argues that the Federal 
Reserve's leverage over the economy may stem as much from the Christina D.  Romer and David H.  Romer  197 
Figure 8.  Behavior of the Certificate of Deposit-Commercial  Paper Yield Differential 
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distinctive  properties  of the loans that banks make as from the unique 
characteristics  of the transactions  deposits that  they receive. According 
to this view, tight monetary  policy has a direct impact  on bank  lending, 
and  credit  market  imperfections  cause many  bank  borrowers  not to have 
easy access to alternative sources of funds. The effect of monetary 
policy on bank lending  thus leads to a reduction  in aggregate  demand. 
Examining  the behavior  of financial  variables  and  real output  in a series 
of episodes of restrictive monetary  policy, we are unable to find any 
support  for this view. We find that the evidence is instead much more 
consistent  with a conventional  textbook account in which the Federal 
Reserve's  influence  over  the  economy  stems  from  the  impact  of monetary 
policy on the stock of transactions  balances. 
It is difficult  to know how broadly  our results should  be interpreted. 
While we have found no evidence for a narrow lending view of the 
transmission  mechanism,  our results do not imply that bank loans do 198  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
not have important  distinguishing  characteristics.  Indeed, our reading 
of the evidence concerning  banks' responses to tight monetary  policy 
strongly suggests that bank loans are highly imperfect substitutes for 
other assets. Banks' access to alternative  sources of funds, however, 
causes monetary  policy to have little direct impact  on bank  lending. In 
addition,  our  focus has been on the issue of whether  the transmission  of 
monetary  policy to the economy  includes  a direct  effect on bank  lending, 
not on the broader  question of whether credit market  imperfections  in 
general play an important  role in the transmission mechanism. The 
question  of the role of general  credit  rationing  remains  open. 
Finally, in a changing  economy, the channels  of monetary  transmis- 
sion are unlikely  to be constant  over time. Three  of the six episodes that 
we examine (and three of the five that we examine in the most detail) 
occur between the mid-1970s  and the early 1980s,  a period  in which, on 
the one hand, banks were relatively  free to obtain funds from sources 
other than transactions  deposits, and, on the other hand, interest rates 
on transactions  deposits  remained  relatively  tightly  regulated.  Deregula- 
tion  of interest  rates  on transactions  deposits in the 1980s  has very likely 
made  the demand  for  transactions  balances  less responsive  to the  general 
level of interest  rates. As a result, in future  episodes of tight monetary 
policy, bank  loans  are  likely  to bear  a larger  part  of the burden  of adjusting 
to decreases in the quantity  of reserves. Thus although  we have found 
no evidence that  bank  lending  has played  an important  independent  role 
in the transmission  of monetary  policy to the real economy in the major 
episodes of restrictive monetary policy since World War II, we can 
provide  no guarantee  that it will not be critical  in the future. Comments 
and Discussion 
Stephen M.  Goldfeld: It is a pleasure to discuss this paper by the 
Romers, which returns  to what they characterize  as an older literature 
on transmission  mechanisms  and monetary  policy. I regard  this topic 
with some nostalgia  since it was one that  many  people of my generation 
encountered  at a formative  stage of their careers. Indeed, the question 
of whether bank loans are special and the role of banks in the trans- 
mission mechanism  played a prominent  part in my graduate  education 
and  early  professional  interests. 
The  present  paper  seeks to evaluate  a modern  version  of this "lending" 
view and contrast  it with the more conventional "money" view of the 
transmission  process. The Romers compare these views by making 
creative  use of their earlier  work identifying  anti-inflationary  episodes. 
They regard  these episodes as representing  independent  shifts in mone- 
tary policy, thus providing  experiments  for contrasting  the money and 
lending  views. 
The Romers  begin  their  empirical  analysis  with some comparisons  of 
the behavior  of money and lending during  the focal episodes, using a 
regression  for money or loans to correct  for the usual cyclical behavior 
of these variables. The resulting  equations are dynamically  simulated 
through  the  focal periods  to yield  forecasting  errors.  An analysis  of these 
errors  provides some support  for both the money and lending  views in 
the sense that  both money and  lending  fall more  than  one would expect, 
given the declines in output  during  the episodes. The Romers interpret 
the results  as slightly  favoring  the money view, but overall  do not place 
much weight on this evidence. Nevertheless, there are a few points 
worth  making  about  this part  of the analysis, especially since a number 
of them  apply  to the subsequent  analyses as well. 
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First, there is a school of thought that says that static simulation 
residuals would be more appropriate  for their analysis. I hasten to 
observe that this same criticism was made of  my use of  dynamic 
simulations  in work on money demand.  In the context of trying  to judge 
the usefulness  of a model  for forecasting  several  periods  into the future, 
it made sense to me, and it still makes sense, to look at residuals  from 
dynamic simulations. In the context, however, of hypothesis testing, 
which is what is going on in the Romers' paper, the case for looking at 
static  residuals  is rather  stronger,  and  I wish that  they had done so. 
Second, if the residuals  are  systematically  one-sided  during  their  focal 
episodes, they may be systematically on the other side during the 
nonfocal  episodes. It would be nice to know the facts here and whether 
or not there were any differences between the static and dynamic 
residuals. 
Third, the use of dynamic simulations  creates a minor problem in 
interpreting  the results, especially because the equations  are estimated 
in difference  form and must be cumulated  to obtain  the graphs  that are 
provided in the paper. This unfortunately  makes it rather  difficult to 
calculate  a proper  standard  error,  something  that  is necessary  to interpret 
whether  big is big in their  graphs. 
Fourth, there is a sense in which the Romers may have biased the 
results  against  themselves. In particular,  if one believes that  the relevant 
relationship  is different  in focal and nonfocal  episodes, then estimating 
one regression over the full sample will tend to force the regression 
through  the extreme  observations.  But the extreme  observations  are  the 
focal periods, so the residuals may end up downplaying  the unusual 
behavior  in the focal periods.  This argues  for separate  estimation  for the 
focal and nonfocal  episodes, a technique  the Romers  subsequently  use. 
Finally,  the results  from  this part  of the paper  gave me pause as to the 
dating  of the episodes. Unless I am  misreading  it, the results  suggest  that 
the episode beginning in August 1978 is a red herring. This anemic 
episode seems additionally  suspect because it is followed in quick  order 
by another  major  episode, indeed by most measures  the largest shift in 
policy in their sample. One would therefore  think  that there is a double 
reason for this episode to look good and the fact that nothing  happens 
suggests to me that the episode may not qualify as a veritable anti- 
inflationary  one. 
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serious  evidence in favor of the money view over the lending  view. The 
basic tool of analysis  is a variant  of the old-fashioned  St. Louis equation, 
which in the present  context would relate  changes in output  to changes 
in money or changes in loans. The Romers indeed estimate such 
equations,  but they do so in two novel ways. First, using monthly  data 
they estimate  money and  loan versions by ordinary  least squares  (OLS) 
and instrumental  variable  (IV) techniques. Second, in an approach  they 
characterize  as roughly  equivalent, using quarterly  data they estimate 
money and loan equations separately for their nonfocal and focal 
episodes. It is considerably  easier to discuss these in reverse order,  and 
I will do so. 
With  the split-sample  approach,  the Romers  find  that  output  is closely 
related  to money in their  focal periods but not outside. In contrast, the 
lending-output  relationship  is much less different and not necessarily 
stronger  in focal periods. They also emphasize  that there is no lag from 
lending  to output, suggesting  that the effect is from output to lending 
rather  than  the other  way around.  Overall,  these results  are interpreted 
as distinctly  favoring  the money view. 
There  is a little bit of Alice in Wonderland  about  this interpretation  in 
the sense that  the lending-output  relationship  is stronger  and  more  stable 
while the preferred  explanation  is the weaker and unstable one. The 
Romers  provide  a plausible  and  almost  convincing  defense of this view. 
However, one could well imagine  shifts to a more anti-inflationary  but 
more stable monetary  policy that made the money-output  relationship 
weaker in focal periods. This suggests we need to think about these 
equations  in a bit more  detail. 
Loosely speaking,  the Romers' approach  is premised  on the notion 
that  the focal episodes are brought  about  by exogenous regime  changes 
that  turn  the Federal  Reserve into a serious anti-inflationary  fighter  and 
that consequently  there are no systematic factors at work on financial 
variables  during  focal episodes. This seems to suggest that they need 
not  include  any other  variables  in their  version  of the St. Louis equation. 
At times  it also seems to suggest  that  money  is "more  exogenous" during 
focal episodes. There are a number of difficulties with these views, 
although  few of these difficulties  have easy solutions. 
Even if it is true  that  other  variables  are not needed  for focal periods, 
they do estimations  over nonfocal  periods and compare  these with the 
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in the nonfocal  periods,  the comparison  does not seem to be a completely 
fair one. The Romers themselves suggest one variable that may be 
omitted  from  the money-output  regressions, namely  loans. Despite the 
recognition  that  the lending  and  money  views are  not mutually  exclusive, 
the analysis is structured  as a horse race between the two views. The 
suggestion is made that there is inadequate  information  available to 
estimate the joint role of money and lending. While this may be true, 
although  no evidence is provided,  if both variables  are relevant,  running 
a separate  horse race involves a specification  error. Even the original 
purveyors  of the St. Louis equation,  who did not believe in fiscal  policy, 
used both fiscal  and  money measures. 
Because the split-sample  approach  is estimated  by OLS and  because, 
with the possible exception of money during  focal periods, both money 
and  lending  are  properly  regarded  as endogenous  variables,  simultaneity 
is an issue. That is, the estimated equations reflect both supply and 
demand  forces in some  unholy  fashion  that  is a bit  difficult  to disentangle. 
In the case of money, for example, it would seem to matter  whether 
the operating  procedure  of the Federal  Reserve involves an interest  rate 
policy or a money stock policy. Only in the latter  case might  one argue 
that money is exogenous. However, even in their  focal periods, several 
types of policies were pursued  over the sample period suggesting  that 
not only is money endogeneity  an issue but also there were structural 
changes, which are unaccounted  for, in their sample. On the demand 
side, as one who had  a misspent  youth  worrying  about  instabilities  in the 
money demand  function, I am somewhat  curious as to where they are 
buried  in this story. Overall,  this suggests to me that the use of M-1 to 
characterize  monetary  policy may be somewhat  clouded and the use of 
OLS may not be appropriate.  Similar caveats apply to the lending 
equations. 
When they use their full sample, the Romers explicitly note the 
endogeneity of both money and lending and use IV techniques. They 
note that  if shifts  to anti-inflationary  policy are  exogenous, then  a dummy 
variable  that  is associated  with the episodes provides  a useful additional 
instrument.  They then suggest that the IV estimator summarizes  the 
money-output  relationship  in focal periods while the OLS estimator 
summarizes  the usual  money-output  relation.  Given this interpretation, 
a comparison of the OLS and IV estimates yields results that are 
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I must confess that this is one of those ideas that I do not fully 
understand  but that nevertheless seems quite clever. My concerns are 
of two sorts. First, as the Romers  state, even the IV approach  is unlikely 
to provide  consistent estimates. If this is the case, and for the reasons 
outlined above I believe it is, I am unsure what conclusions we are 
entitled  to draw  from  the comparison  they make. Second, to the extent 
that  relevant  variables  are omitted  from the analysis, the comparison  is 
further  clouded,  just as it is in the split-sample  approach. 
The  final  set of issues I want  to address  concerns  the interpretation  of 
the lending  view. The Romers state that their central  goal is to provide 
evidence on credit market  imperfections  that stem from informational 
asymmetries.  This  raises  the question  of whether  the loan  measures  they 
use-total  bank loans, business loans, and loan commitments-are 
appropriate  indicators  for the phenomenon  of interest. It is not clear to 
me that any of these measures  necessarily captures  the effect of credit 
market  imperfections. 
Total  loans includes  mortgages,  which do not fit their  story, whereas 
the latter  two categories  exclude consumer  loans, which may be impor- 
tant. Even within  the class of business customers, it is not clear that  the 
measures  used are up to the task. Loan commitments  may pertain  to 
high-quality  customers, and it may be the borrowers  who never make  it 
into the loan commitment data who get rationed. Moreover, total 
business  loans is a rather  heterogeneous  aggregate  including  borrowers 
with varying  degrees of creditworthiness. 
I was also puzzled  by the various  caveats in the paper  concerning  the 
lending view. On the one hand, the Romers suggest the evidence is 
against  the  lending  view because  it implies  there  is no lag  between  lending 
and  output. On the other hand, they argue  that the money view is quite 
consistent  with credit  crunches  and  with rationing  being  important,  also 
suggesting  that they are only focusing on the initial  impact  of monetary 
policy. While  I understand  the flavor  of these distinctions,  I am less sure 
that  their  empirical  approach  is capable  of making  these distinctions. 
The other  complicating  factor  in assessing the lending  view is that  for 
at least the first part of the sample period banks did not have a ready 
access to funds to make loans when reserves were curtailed, either 
because  CDs did not exist or because of interest  rate ceilings or reserve 
requirements.  In  such  a world  the  lending  view should  be more  important, 
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episodes. While this is reassuring,  it does raise some doubts about the 
wisdom  of estimating  the same lending  model  over the entire sample. 
Despite these reservations, the Romers have written a thought- 
provoking  paper that forces us to think about a number  of important 
issues. Moreover,  they have done so in a way that makes  intelligent  use 
of their  earlier  work on identifying  anti-inflationary  episodes. 
Benjamin M.  Friedman: Christina Romer and David Romer have 
emerged  as the leading  academic  proponents  of the Watch-What-I-Say 
approach  to central  banking. 
The fundamental  methodological  presumption  underlying  both this 
paper and its predecessor is that the best guide to whether monetary 
policy has changed is not the actions taken in the Federal Reserve's 
trading  room  but the words spoken  in its boardroom. 
This is, of course, greatly  comforting  to our central  bankers,  whose 
behavior clearly reflects their realization  that although  they inhabit a 
world in which talk about some subjects can be expensive and maybe 
even dangerous-ready examples  are  exchange  rates  and  stock prices- 
when it comes to monetary  policy, talk is cheap enough. Hence when 
the Romers  write, "That  the Federal  Reserve publicly  announced  that 
it was undertaking  a dramatic  shift  in monetary  policy to reduce  the rate 
of inflation  strongly suggests that there was an independent  shock to 
monetary  policy," they no doubt  provide  substantial  reassurance  to our 
current Federal Reserve leaders, who have publicly announced that 
reducing  the rate of inflation  to zero is the chief goal of U.S. monetary 
policy but have yet to take any visible action that might render this 
announcement  a reality. 
Naturally, any notion that gives so much comfort to proponents  of 
one school of thought  must be distressing  to at least some people who 
think  otherwise.  In  this  case, the  methodological  presumption  underlying 
the Romers'  work contradicts  familiar  thinking  not only in arguing  that 
it is more  important  to watch  boardroom  give and  take  than  trading  room 
buys and sells, but also in implicitly  holding  that there exists no simple 
quantitative  measure  of trading  room  activity to watch. For example, as 
the upper  panel  of table  4 suggests  (and  as the discussion  in  their  previous 
paper  makes  explicit)  they identify  several  of their  episodes of monetary 
policy tightening  entirely  without  reference  to the quantity  of money or 
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The chief question addressed in this paper, however, is not which 
variable-money or any other-is  the best indicator  of monetary  policy, 
but rather  the process by which central  bank  actions affect nonfinancial 
economic activity. To this end, the Romers identify two alternatives. 
Under  what they call the "money view," reducing  the quantity  of bank 
reserves leads, through  the standard  mechanics of fractional reserve 
banking,  to a smaller  quantity  of transactions  balances,  and  hence, given 
conventionally specified money demand behavior, to higher market- 
clearing interest rates-which,  in turn, depress the demand for real 
goods and services in any or all of a familiar  variety  of ways. 
By contrast,  under  the "lending  view," transactions  deposits issued 
by banks are sufficiently substitutable  for liabilities issued by other 
institutions  that  restricting  banks'  ability  to create  money  need not cause 
interest  rates  to rise much,  if at all. But because bank  loans are  not ready 
substitutes  for credit  extended  by other  institutions,  the parallel  restric- 
tions on banks' ability  to lend does lead to higher  interest  rates, as well 
as to now-familiar  rationing  effects-both  of which, again, depress real 
aggregate  demand.  (Needless to say-except  that a reader  of the paper 
might  easily get the opposite  impression-these two mechanisms  are  not 
mutually  exclusive, and so in reality  both may be operative simultane- 
ously.) 
What  is clearly at issue here is, first, the extent to which the central 
bank  can actually  limit  banks'  ability  to create  either  liabilities  or assets, 
and, second, a comparison  of the substitutability  of bank  and nonbank 
liabilities  against  the substitutability  of bank  and nonbank  assets. 
These are not new issues, nor is there good reason to be confident 
that  the answers  describing  how monetary  policy worked  in this regard 
at any  particular  time in the past  are  identical  to those pertinent  to today. 
For example, when the Federal  Reserve first  dropped  the Regulation  Q 
interest  ceiling on large certificates  of deposit, in June 1970,  it was not 
long before economists pointed out that the monetary authority  had 
thereby  surrendered  part  of its ability  to restrict  bank  lending.  Similarly, 
economists'  discussion  of the development  of NOW  accounts  and  money 
market  mutual  funds at the outset of the 1980s  amply emphasized  the 
resulting  increased substitutability  of transactions  balances issued by 
banks  and  nonbanks. 
The Romers'  principal  contribution  to this line of inquiry  is to use 
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their reading  of Federal Open Market  Committee  minutes and policy 
statements,  to identify  those movements  of either  transactions  balances 
or bank loans that may plausibly  correspond  to these respective views 
of the monetary  policy  process.  Their  use of what  they  call "nonstatistical 
evidence" as what amounts (in a statistical sense) to an identification 
device is most explicit in the section of their  paper  in which they report 
instrumental  variable  regressions  in which zero-one dummy variables 
for  their  series  of tight  monetary  policy episodes serve  as the instruments 
for both money and  bank  loans. But at a broader  conceptual  level, their 
list of episodes  is implicitly  playing  this  identification  role  in  the empirical 
analysis  carried  out throughout  the paper. 
In the end, the Romers  interpret  their  results as favoring  the money 
view over the lending  view. While  I do not necessarily  disagree  with  this 
conclusion-in  large part because of their narrow  conception of what 
they call the lending  view-I  do have several  reservations. 
The first piece of quantitative  evidence that the Romers offer in 
support  of the money view over the lending view is that, as shown in 
figure  5, during  the first  year or so after  the shift  to tight  monetary  policy 
that they identify, money tends on average to grow more slowly, but 
bank loans more rapidly,  than would be expected conditionally  on the 
prior path of output and of either money or bank lending itself. As 
inspection  of table 4 shows, however, these average  patterns  across all 
five tight  money episodes are, in both cases, mostly driven  by only one 
episode:  the 1979  policy change  in the case of money, and  the 1974  policy 
change  in the case of bank  loans. 
A further  piece of evidence that the Romers introduce  in support  of 
the money view over the lending view rests on lead-lag  relationships. 
(In  this respect, their  assertion  that  previous  researchers'  studies "make 
no effort to  address issues of  endogeneity" is  uncharacteristically 
ungenerous.  One can easily agree that the Romers' procedures,  incor- 
porating  their  nonstatistical  evidence, potentially  add  value  with  respect 
to the standard  Granger-Sims  exogeneity tests, without claiming  that 
the large literature  applying  those standard  tests to systems including 
output, money, and credit measures did not even constitute an effort 
along  these lines.) In table  5 they show that, although  OLS regression  of 
output  on current  and  lagged  bank  loans always has a higher  R2 than  the 
analogous  OLS regression  of output  on current  and lagged money, the 
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between  output  and  bank  loans  is mostly  contemporaneous.  The respec- 
tive response patterns  plotted in figure  6 suggest that the same is true, 
but  even more  so, for  the corresponding  IV regressions.  (It  is unfortunate 
that  the paper  does not show the actual  IV regression  results.)  Given  the 
patterns of money and bank loan movements in the individual  tight 
money episodes as shown in table 4, however, I came away from both 
the OLS and the IV regression  exercises wondering  whether  here too 
the money results reflect mostly the 1979  episode, and the bank loan 
results  mostly  the 1974  episode. 
A further  aspect  of these regressions,  which  the Romers  highlight  (but 
stop short of directly citing as evidence favoring  the money view over 
the lending  view), is how the money-output  relationship  and the loan- 
output  relationship  differ  depending  on whether  the economy is or is not 
in a tight money episode. As table 5 shows, the R2 of the regression  of 
output  on bank  loans is greater  than  that  of the corresponding  regression 
with money, for any sample period that they investigate. But as the 
Romers  point  out, "while  the  lending-output  relationship  is little  different 
at times of large  independent  shifts in monetary  policy than  it is at other 
times ...  the relationship  between money and output, particularly  the 
link  between  lagged  money  and  output,  is to a large  extent  a phenomenon 
solely of the episodes of anti-inflationary  policy." The basis for this 
argument  is the sharply higher R2 (and, correspondingly,  coefficient 
values and t-statistics)  when the regressions  with money (but  not loans) 
are estimated  for the subsamples including  the tight monetary  policy 
episodes only, compared  with the results  for the subsamples  consisting 
of all other  observations. 
The mere  change  in regression  estimates, however, does not provide 
a firm  basis for inferring  that the evidence favors the money view over 
the lending  view. Suppose, for example, that during  the period  before a 
decision to tighten monetary policy the central bank had permitted 
substantial  variability  of money growth, and that the immediate  conse- 
quence  of its tightening  decision  were smoother  money  growth  (presum- 
ably at a slower rate than the previous average). Further  suppose that 
what  the  Romers  call  the money  view of the monetary  policy  transmission 
mechanism  were precisely  correct.  In that  case, the regression  of output 
on money  would  exhibit not a higher  but a lower  R2 during  tight money 
episodes  than  at other  times. 
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odological thrust  of both this paper  and its predecessor  by highlighting 
the limited  use that, in the end, the Romers  have made of their nonsta- 
tistical evidence. Once they have used the FOMC minutes and policy 
records  to identify  a series  of dates  that  they identify  (rightly  or not)  with 
Federal  Reserve decisions to tighten  monetary  policy for reasons other 
than responding  to movements  in real output, all the analysis that they 
carry out in these papers is purely statistical  in nature. Although  they 
appeal to Milton Friedman  and Anna Schwartz as the inspiration  for 
their use of nonstatistical  evidence, there is actually nothing here to 
correspond  to Friedman  and Schwartz's  narrative  analysis  of what was 
happening  within  each episode. 
Finally, apart  from  criticisms  of the specifics, what should  one think 
about the Romers'  conclusion that the money view is preferable  to the 
lending  view as a description  of how monetary  policy works? Here it is 
crucial to return to the issues that lie at the core of the distinction 
between the two views that they compare: first, the central bank's 
relative  ability  to limit  banks'  creation  of money, as against  their  creation 
of credit;  and, second, the respective substitutability  between bank  and 
nonbank  liabilities  and  between bank  and  nonbank  assets. 
Especially for the historical period under study here-to  recall, a 
period characterized,  for the most part, by no Regulation  Q ceiling, at 
least on large  CDs, and by low or zero reserve requirements  on at least 
some CDs-it  is not difficult  to believe that  the Federal  Reserve has had 
greater ability to limit creation of transactions balances than bank 
lending. Further,  at least judging  from my own empirical  work on the 
relationship  between credit and the determination  of either nominal  or 
real income, the evidence has always pointed in the direction  of a role 
for total credit,  inclusive  of advances  by all lenders,  rather  than  for bank 
credit alone-as  would be  expected if bank loans and loans from 
nonbanks  were close substitutes  for many, if not most, borrowers. 
The key point  here is the focus of this paper  on the banking  system- 
a focus that  is appropriate  enough  as a starting  point for any discussion 
of monetary  policy, to be sure, but that is fairly  narrow  compared  with 
many familiar views of the institutions and behavioral mechanisms 
involved in the process by which monetary policy affects output, 
including  views to which the Romers  refer  in this paper.  After all, there 
is no necessary contradiction  between the claim that, between bank 
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tight  monetary  policy occurs on the liability  side, and  the view that  shifts 
in the ability or willingness  of lenders in the aggregate  to supply credit 
is a major  (or  even the  major)  financial  influence  on nonfinancial  economic 
activity. 
General Discussion 
Several panelists objected to studying the channels through  which 
monetary  policy works as if the exercise were a horserace  between the 
paper's two alternatives,  the "money" view and the "lending" view. 
William  Brainard  noted that the transmission  mechanism  presumably 
includes a multitude  of channels. The traditional  mechanisms  include 
interest  rate  effects on expenditures  for investment  in plant,  equipment, 
and inventories;  wealth and rate effects on consumption;  and rate and 
rationing  effects on housing. The attempt to capture this variety of 
mechanisms  in M-1 and bank loans artificially  limits the investigation. 
Ben Bernanke suggested that the authors treat money as the policy 
instrument  and treat interest rates and the quantity of loans as the 
channels in an attempt to gauge the relative importance  of each. He 
observed that if bonds and loans are perfect substitutes, then what 
matters  is the total of the two, and there is no reason for there to be a 
correlation  between loans alone and  output. 
Several  panelists  found it hard  to interpret  the authors'  results in the 
absence of a structural  model. Franco Modigliani  noted that, since a 
large  part  of commercial  loans goes into inventories, it is not surprising 
that  bank  loans and  economic activity move contemporaneously;  there- 
fore, he was not convinced that  the lack of significance  for lagged  loans 
demonstrates  that  changes in credit  do not cause changes  in output. He 
added that the important  question is which policy instruments  better 
control  the  economy, not  which  have  historically  had  a higher  correlation 
with output. Bernanke  described  a mechanism  that is compatible  with 
the authors'  empirical  results, but in which loans are more important 
than  money.  Imagine  that  both  money  and  loans  have  two-way  causation 
with income, but that the relationship  running  from loans to income, 
although  stronger  than  from  money to income, does not vary in strength 
between ordinary  times and periods of tight money. In this case, we 
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also felt that  the authors  mischaracterized  banks'  marginal  cost of funds 
as the CD rate. Banks gain valuable information  about the actions of 
their  borrowers  by monitoring  their  transaction  accounts. Because there 
are important  economies of scope between transactions  deposits and 
CDs, the cost of funds  is not simply  the CD rate, but a weighted  average 
of deposit  and CD rates. 
Brainard  emphasized  that it is important  to examine how the trans- 
mission mechanism  has changed over the period in question. He ob- 
served that although  recent theoretical  advances have drawn  attention 
to credit  rationing  as an important  part  of the transmission  mechanism, 
institutional  changes in the financial  system may have made rationing 
less important  than it was in the 1950s and 1960s. In the same vein, 
Stephen Cecchetti warned against using the results as  a basis for 
monetary  policy because  of the institutional  changes  that  have occurred 
since the end of the sample period. William Branson defended the 
authors'  use of the minutes  of meetings  of the Open  Market  Committee 
as a way to identify  periods  of exogenous money tightening,  noting  that 
the authors'  periods  lined  up well with movements  in the spread  usually 
taken  as evidence of tight  money. Christina D.  Romer and David  H.  Romer  211 
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